2020 COA 75
Colo. Ct. App.2020Background
- Collision between plaintiff David May (wheelchair user) and defendant Michelle Petersen's car at a school crosswalk during morning drop-off; May suffered a head injury.
- Surveillance video and witness testimony showed Petersen's vehicle was already well into the crosswalk when May entered from a ramp/landing pad area; trial court found May did not pause at the landing pad and was traveling at an unsafe speed.
- Trial court concluded Petersen was not negligent and that May's negligence more likely than not caused the collision; judgment entered for defendant after a bench trial.
- May appealed, raising three main legal claims about statutory duties to yield to disabled pedestrians, the definition of crosswalk (whether it includes the ramp/curb cut), and the applicable standard of care for a wheelchair user.
- Appellate court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and factual findings for clear error, deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §§ 42‑4‑807 and 42‑4‑808(1) establish negligence as a matter of law (strict liability) when a driver collides with an obviously disabled pedestrian | May: § 42‑4‑808(1) requires drivers to immediately stop upon approaching an obviously disabled person, so Petersen was negligent per se for failing to stop | Petersen: Statutes impose duties but negligence depends on facts (e.g., whether driver was "approaching"); comparative negligence and circumstances matter | Held: No strict liability; whether driver exercised due care is factual. § 42‑4‑808(1) requires stopping when a vehicle is approaching a disabled person, not automatic liability in all collisions. |
| Whether the handicap ramp/curb cut is part of the statutory "crosswalk" for right‑of‑way purposes | May: Ramp is part of the crosswalk and once on ramp he had right of way; he also argued inability to stop once on ramp | Petersen: Crosswalk statutory definition limits it to roadway portion; ramp/sidewalk are excluded from roadway | Held: Crosswalk limited to portion of roadway; ramp is not part of crosswalk under § 42‑1‑102(21) and § 42‑1‑102(85). Factual findings about May’s speed/behavior control outcome. |
| Standard of care to apply to a wheelchair user | May: Standard should be that of a reasonable person under like disability; court applied ordinary pedestrian standard | Petersen: Court correctly considered disability as one factual circumstance among others | Held: Trial court properly considered May’s disability and relevant circumstances; no error in applying the reasonable‑person assessment adapted to facts. |
Key Cases Cited
- McCall v. Meyers, 94 P.3d 1271 (Colo. App. 2004) (§ 42‑4‑808(1) does not eliminate comparative negligence; statutory duty does not create strict liability)
- Radetsky v. Leonard, 358 P.2d 1014 (Colo. 1961) (pedestrian halfway across road struck while driver failed to see her; used in contrast to facts here)
- Ridenour v. Diffee, 297 P.2d 280 (Colo. 1956) (pedestrians nearly to center of roadway before being struck; used for context on right‑of‑way analyses)
- Pueblo Transp. Co. v. Moylan, 226 P.2d 806 (Colo. 1951) (ordinary prudence standard for pedestrians is a factual question for the factfinder)