May v. Buck, 375 S.W.3d 568

Background

January 20, 2005: May, Buck, and Petrox Energy Corp. entered a letter agreement to acquire Leon County mineral rights; May would fund leasing, Buck would lease and assign mineral rights around a specific unit; Exhibit A describes four tracts totaling 563.465 acres; the agreement references a 100-acre spacing centered around the David Morris Gas Unit #1.
May later sued Buck (and Petrox) when Buck did not assign mineral rights as contemplated; suit also included tortious interference and other claims, with Union Energy, Inc. and Lane McNamara intervening.
The parties held a bench trial on whether the statute of frauds barred May’s claims; expert testimony addressed possible shapes of the 100-acre spacing (donut/halo shape vs. others).
The trial court found the letter description did not satisfy the statute of frauds and entered judgment for appellees.
This appeal challenges the trial court’s legal and evidentiary rulings on the statute of frauds, including interpretation of the property description and the use of extrinsic evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Letter Agreement satisfy the statute of frauds’ certainty requirement for real property descriptions?	May/Buck argue the four Exhibit A tracts and the 100-acre spacing provide sufficient certainty.	Buck/Petrox contend the reference to the David Morris Gas Unit #1 creates a sufficiently identifiable description.	No; writing fails to identify the land with reasonable certainty.
Was the trial court allowed to consider extrinsic evidence to interpret the property description?	May/May's deposition and extrinsic materials clarify the meaning of the 100-acre spacing.	Defendants argue parol evidence cannot supply essential terms; only clarifies.	Yes, but still not sufficient to cure the lack of certainty.
Did May's deposition/testimony improperly influence the judgment on certainty of the land description?	May’s understanding centers around the well bore; testimony could aid interpretation.	Admission was cumulative and did not alter the outcome.	Harmless error; judgment proper without it.
Did the experts’ admissions regarding possible 100-acre configurations show the description could be identified with certainty?	Elbert acknowledged multiple reasonable configurations; Morgan’s view was just one option.	Any single configuration does not prove certainty given multiple possibilities.	Expert testimony supports lack of reasonable certainty; description invalid.
Was the Letter Agreement ambiguous as a matter of law, and did the court properly address it?	No argument of ambiguity; agreement should be clear.	Contract can be ambiguous even if not expressly asserted; construction matters.	Yes, the contract is ambiguous; ambiguity upheld for purposes of statute of frauds.

Key Cases Cited

Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1972) (writing must identify land with reasonable certainty; parol evidence cannot supply essential terms)
Texas Builders v. Keller, 928 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. 1996) (writing must identify property with reasonable certainty; unidentified portion of larger tract insufficient)
Butler v. Benefield, 589 S.W.2d 778 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1979) (statute not satisfied when multiple tracts fit description)
Reiland v. Patrick Thomas Properties, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 431 (Tex.App.-Houston 2006) (size, shape, and boundaries must be described; unidentified portions insufficient)
Fears v. Texas Bank, 247 S.W.3d 729 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008) (consideration of survey or ground evidence; identification matters)
Apex Fin. Corp. v. Garza, 155 S.W.3d 230 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004) (whether description allows locating premises with reasonable certainty)
Dixon v. Amoco Prod. Co., 150 S.W.3d 191 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004) (de novo review of legal conclusions on statute of frauds)
Wilson v. Fisher, 188 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1945) (parol may aid descriptions but cannot be framework of contract)
O’Herin v. Neal, 56 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex.App.) (parol evidence limitations in land description)
Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1972) (reiterated rule on data for identifying land)