Maxim Crane Works v. Zurich Amer Ins, 11 F.4th 345

Skanska (general contractor) required subcontractors to join a contractor-controlled insurance program (CCIP) providing workers’ compensation; Berkel was a subcontractor in the CCIP.
Berkel leased a crane from Maxim under a bare rental agreement and named Maxim as an additional insured on Berkel’s Zurich-issued commercial general liability (CGL) policy; Maxim was not in the CCIP.
A Berkel employee operating the crane injured Tyler Lee, a Skanska supervisor; Lee recovered workers’ compensation benefits under the CCIP and later sued Berkel and Maxim; jury allocated most fault to Berkel.
Maxim settled with Lee and Zurich (Maxim’s insurer) paid the loss then sought reimbursement; Zurich denied Maxim coverage as an additional insured under Berkel’s policy citing the Texas Anti‑Indemnity Act (TAIA).
After cross-litigation and state appellate rulings (the state court held Berkel and Lee were statutory co‑employees under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act), Maxim sued Zurich; the district court granted summary judgment for Zurich, concluding the TAIA barred coverage; Maxim appealed.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit held Maxim has contractual standing, rejected Zurich’s cross‑appeal as unnecessary, and certified the dispositive statutory question about the TAIA employee exception to the Supreme Court of Texas.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Contractual standing / assignment of rights under Maxim’s own CGL policy	Maxim retained the right to sue because its policy assigns only future "reimbursable" amounts to Zurich and Maxim already reimbursed Zurich	Zurich contends Maxim assigned away its recovery rights to Zurich via its policy assignment clause	Court held Maxim has contractual standing; assignment covers future reimbursable sums only; ambiguities construed against Zurich
TAIA employee exception: whether a worker deemed a "co‑employee" under TWCA is an "employee" for TAIA §151.103 so additional insured coverage is allowed	Maxim: TWCA finding of "statutory co‑employee" equates to functional employer/employee relationship so TAIA exception applies and additional insured coverage is enforceable	Zurich: TAIA lacks a definition of "employee," the ordinary meaning excludes Lee as Berkel’s employee, and TWCA definitions are limited to workers’ comp context	Court declined to resolve under Texas law and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Texas for definitive interpretation
Necessity of Zurich’s cross‑appeal on standing	(implicit) Zurich argued standing warranted appellate challenge	Zurich argued cross‑appeal was not required because standing here is contractual not jurisdictional	Court held cross‑appeal unnecessary; contractual standing is a merits issue and arguments supporting the judgment can be raised without a cross‑appeal

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (distinguishing Article III standing from merits/third‑party rights)
SM Kids, LLC v. Google LLC, 963 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2020) (contractual standing distinct from Article III standing)
Bowersox Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Harco Nat’l Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2000) (contract interpretation: respect text tense distinctions)
TGS‑NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. 2011) (statutory interpretation and giving undefined terms ordinary meaning unless context dictates otherwise)
Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., Inc., 783 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Sheline v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 948 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1991) (summary judgment appropriate for pure questions of law)
JCB, Inc. v. Horsburgh & Scott Co., 912 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2018) (favoring certification to state supreme court for unsettled state law questions)