Maxene Blood v. Willow-wist Farm, Inc., 81848-1

Background

Maxine Blood was injured at Willow-Wist Farm during a county farm tour when an employee of Viking Feast Ice Cream (Amber Golding) abruptly turned in a farm store and collided with her, causing a femur fracture requiring surgery and extended hospitalization.
Viking Feast ran out of ice cream and Golding went into the farm store to retrieve pints; Blood was at the milk case when the collision occurred.
Blood sued Willow-Wist (store owner), Viking Feast (vendor), and Golding alleging negligent overcrowding of the store and failure to maintain safe premises.
Willow-Wist moved for summary judgment; Blood opposed with testimony and a Human Factors expert (Joellen Gill) asserting crowded conditions can contribute to contact between patrons.
The trial court granted Willow-Wist’s summary judgment, finding no genuine issue that store crowding proximately caused the injury; it later denied Blood’s motion for reconsideration.
Blood obtained a judgment against Viking Feast and appealed the dismissal of Willow-Wist; the Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment, concluding lack of proximate cause and that the expert’s opinion was conclusory.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether summary judgment was improper because store overcrowding caused Blood’s injury (proximate cause)	Blood: crowding in the store created a foreseeable danger that caused the collision.	Willow‑Wist: evidence shows the specific area by the freezer/milk case was not crowded and Golding had space to avoid Blood; no causal link.	Court: Affirmed summary judgment — undisputed evidence shows sufficient space at incident site; overcrowding was not a proximate cause.
Whether Blood’s expert affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact	Blood: Human Factors expert says crowded conditions can increase contact and could have contributed.	Willow‑Wist: expert opinion is conditional, conclusory, and speculative; insufficient to defeat summary judgment.	Court: Expert’s statement was speculative/conditional and did not create a genuine factual dispute.
Whether general/storewide crowding suffices to establish negligence at the incident site	Blood: general evidence of a crowded store supports negligent overcrowding theory.	Willow‑Wist: legal focus must be on the specific area where the injury occurred, not the store as a whole.	Court: Must analyze the specific area; general crowding alone did not establish causation or breach.
Whether the trial court erred by denying reconsideration of the summary judgment	Blood: trial court should have reconsidered and vacated dismissal.	Willow‑Wist: dismissal was proper; reconsideration denial need not be reached if summary judgment affirmed.	Court: Did not reach reconsideration separately because affirming summary judgment rendered it unnecessary.

Key Cases Cited

Mohandessi v. Urban Venture LLC, 13 Wn. App. 2d 681 (2020) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768 (1985) (proximate cause: cause in fact and legal causation)
Moore v. Hagge, 158 Wn. App. 137 (2010) (court may decide causation as a matter of law when connection is speculative)
Doherty v. Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 83 Wn. App. 464 (1996) (when causal connection is too speculative for jury)
Cho v. City of Seattle, 185 Wn. App. 10 (2014) (expert conclusory opinions insufficient to defeat summary judgment)
Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wn.2d 441 (1985) (expert identification of factual disputes does not substitute for admissible evidence creating genuine issues)
Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195 (1992) (legal causation intertwined with duty)