Maurico Grandberry v. State of Tennessee, W2020-00734-CCA-R3-PC

Petitioner Maurico Grandberry and co-defendant Calvin Person were tried jointly for first-degree felony murder arising from a robbery that resulted in the victim being shot with a .38 revolver; both were convicted and sentenced to life.
Multiple witnesses placed the petitioner at or near the scene; petitioner made statements implicating his presence and admitted post‑shooting conduct (including selling the .38 revolver used in the killing).
Defense strategy: counsel opposed severance and sought to keep prior statements by each defendant excluded under Bruton concerns; petitioner did not testify at trial.
Mid‑trial the co‑defendant unexpectedly testified and implicated petitioner; trial counsel conferred with other lawyers and advised severance but petitioner declined to sever and chose not to testify.
Petitioner filed a post‑conviction claim alleging ineffective assistance for failing to pursue severance after the co‑defendant’s damaging testimony; the post‑conviction court denied relief and this Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to sever after the co‑defendant’s damaging testimony	Grandberry: counsel had a duty to protect him once co‑defendant testified and should have moved to sever; failure was deficient performance	State: counsel made a reasoned strategic choice to oppose severance pretrial to exclude inculpatory statements; petitioner repeatedly declined severance and elected strategy	Court: Counsel’s conduct was strategic, discussed with petitioner, and not deficient; petitioner failed to show prejudice
Whether any deficient performance prejudiced the outcome	Grandberry: once co‑defendant testified, prejudice was likely because testimony wrecked joint defense	State: even without co‑defendant’s testimony, overwhelming independent evidence implicated Grandberry (witness threats, admissions, sale of the murder weapon)	Court: Even assuming deficiency, petitioner could not show a reasonable probability of a different result; no prejudice proven

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996) (standards for attorney performance review in Tennessee)
Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1996) (post‑conviction findings of fact are conclusive unless preponderated against)
Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. 1997) (appellate review limits on factual reweighing in post‑conviction)
Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1998) (de novo review of legal issues in post‑conviction proceedings)
Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2001) (mixed‑question nature of ineffective assistance claims)
Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975) (professional conduct standard for counsel performance)
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955) (presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance)