Maurice Meyer, III v. Carolyn Colvin, 754 F.3d 251

Meyer applied for Social Security disability benefits after a 2004 spinal injury; ALJ denied his claim finding work ability.
Between 2005 and 2006 Meyer showed improvements; some treating physicians noted no apparent distress and independent ambulation.
Dr. Weissglass, Meyer’s independent evaluator, concluded Meyer could not work outside the home, but the ALJ found his report unpersuasive.
Dr. Bailey, Meyer’s treating surgeon, submitted a letter in which he described chronic pain and ongoing care needs, agreeing with Weissglass on many points.
The Appeals Council incorporated Bailey’s letter into the record but denied review of the ALJ’s decision, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision.
Meyer challenged in federal court; the district court remanded to the ALJ about Bailey’s letter and absenteeism evidence; on remand Meyer sought EAJA fees.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the government’s position was substantially justified.	Meyer argues Bailey’s letter undermines the decision; the government’s stance on substantial evidence failed.	The government contends its position was reasonable given Bailey’s letter was not new and material and the ALJ’s reliance on other evidence was proper.	Yes; overall position reasonably justified given the record and issues, including one favorable ruling for the government.
Did the change in position on Bailey’s letter affect substantial justification?	Meyer asserts the change shows lack of substantial justification.	The change did not alter the core argument; Bailey’s letter remained of limited utility and duplicative.	No; the change did not remove substantial justification because the core argument remained reasonable.
Should Meyer prevail for attorney’s fees given remand and the prior remand instruction?	Meyer maintained prevailing status due to remand and remand to consider Bailey’s letter and absenteeism.	Government argues the case was a close decision; not automatically non-substantial, thus no fee award.	Affirmed district court’s denial of fees; no EAJA award.

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (substantial justification is a reasonableness standard)
Roanoke River Basin Ass’n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1993) (consider total litigation posture in substantial-justification analysis)
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (substantial evidence is what a reasonable mind might accept)
Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993) (EAJA fee considerations; prevailing party analysis)
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1996) (weight given to treating physicians' opinions)
Wilkins v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 953 F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 1991) (newness and materiality of evidence for administrative review)
United States v. 515 Granby, LLC, 736 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2013) (pre-litigation position relevant to fee analysis)
Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2000) (absenteeism evidence and disability evaluation context)