Maurice Didon v. Alicia Castillo
838 F.3d 313
3rd Cir.2016Background
- Two children (A.D. and J.D.) lived with their mother and father on the island of Saint Martin, which is divided into French Saint Martin and Dutch Sint Maarten; the family’s home was in Dutch Sint Maarten while the children attended school and received services in French Saint Martin.
- French Saint Martin (via France) is a Hague Convention contracting state; Dutch Sint Maarten is not.
- Father (Didon) obtained an ex parte French custody order (after mother traveled to the U.S. with the children and did not return). Father filed a Hague Convention petition in U.S. federal court seeking return of the children to French Saint Martin.
- The District Court found the children had concurrent habitual residence in both countries, granted the petition as to A.D. (father’s biological son) and denied as to J.D. (father lacked custody rights at retention date).
- On appeal, the Third Circuit held the Hague Convention does not permit concurrent habitual residence; it found the children’s habitual residence was Dutch Sint Maarten (the country where they lived), which does not apply the Convention, and therefore dismissed the petition and vacated the District Court’s judgments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Didon) | Defendant's Argument (Dominguez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a child may have concurrent habitual residence in two countries under the Hague Convention | Concurrent habitual residence is possible here given the island’s integrated daily life and the children’s significant ties to both sides | Habitual residence should be the country where the children actually lived (Dutch Sint Maarten); Convention should not be applied if habitual residence is a non-contracting state | A child may have only one habitual residence at a time under the Convention; concurrent habitual residence is not permitted |
| Whether the children’s habitual residence was French Saint Martin (Convention state) or Dutch Sint Maarten (non-Convention) | The family’s regular activities in French Saint Martin (school, medical care, administrative affairs) support French habitual residence | The ordinary meaning of "residence" requires living in the place; the children’s home was in Dutch Sint Maarten, so that is their habitual residence | Habitual residence requires that the child have lived in the country; the children lived only in Dutch Sint Maarten, so their habitual residence is Dutch Sint Maarten |
| Whether the Hague Convention applies when the child’s habitual residence is a non-Contracting State | Convention applies because of the children’s substantial connections to French Saint Martin and the District Court’s finding of concurrent habitual residence | Convention does not apply if the habitual residence is a non-Contracting State (Dutch Sint Maarten) | Because the children’s habitual residence was Dutch Sint Maarten, which does not recognize the Convention, the Convention does not apply and the petition must be dismissed |
| Whether the District Court erred by applying French custody law exclusively in a purported concurrent-habitual-residence scenario | District Court correctly relied on French custody rights (father’s biological custody) to find wrongful retention of A.D. | Concurrent-habitual-residence analysis is inconsistent with the Convention and creates choice-of-law problems; District Court should not have treated both countries as habitual residence simultaneously | District Court erred: concurrent habitual residence is inconsistent with the Convention’s text; analyzing only French law was legally improper in a concurrent-residence framework (but unnecessary once Dutch Sint Maarten is identified as sole habitual residence) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussed as potentially allowing dual/alternating habitual residence in dicta)
- Valenzuela v. Michel, 736 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2013) (adopts alternating-habitual-residence analysis for shuttle custody)
- Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2006) (habitual residence inquiry is fact-intensive and part of Convention framework)
- Karpenko v. Leendertz, 619 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2010) (framework for Hague petitions and stay considerations; unclean-hands doctrine not applied)
- Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (2010) (treaty interpretation begins with text; consider other signatories’ views)
- Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014) (courts must not alter treaty terms under the guise of interpretation)
- Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) (habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact; precedents on single habitual residence)