Maurice Coleman v. Michael Lemke
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 381
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- In 1981 Terrell “TJ” Jackson was murdered in his Chicago home; Arlander Adamson and Gwen Thomas witnessed the attack and identified two assailants at trial. Maurice Coleman and Joseph Barnes were tried together; both convicted of murder and armed robbery and sentenced to natural life.
- Key inculpatory evidence: in‑court and pretrial identifications of Coleman by Adamson and Thomas, Wright’s statements that he drove Coleman and Barnes near TJ’s house and that Coleman later tried to sell TJ’s medallion, and physical evidence that a medallion was stolen.
- Postconviction and collateral developments: Barnes later gave inconsistent accounts, at times exculpating Coleman; Barnes’s trial counsel Rhodes stated Barnes privately said Coleman “had nothing to do with it.” Coleman submitted alibi statements from girlfriend Loretta Cade and her mother.
- District court held a two‑day evidentiary hearing on remand (this case is the second appeal after this court in Coleman I ordered an innocence hearing). The court found Barnes, the Cades, and other new evidence not credible or insufficient.
- The district court concluded Coleman failed to meet the demanding Schlup actual‑innocence standard required to excuse procedural default; the Seventh Circuit affirms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Coleman established actual innocence to excuse procedural default of ineffective‑assistance claims | Coleman: new evidence (Barnes’s recantation/testimony, Rhodes’s account, alibi from Cades, Wilkins’ non‑identifications) shows no reasonable juror would convict | Respondent: new evidence is unreliable or ambiguous; trial eyewitnesses and Wright’s statements remain credible and sufficient for conviction | Held: No. Evidence is not sufficiently credible or probative to meet Schlup gateway; procedural default stands |
| Credibility and weight of Barnes’s recantation and Rhodes’s testimony | Coleman: Barnes’s and Rhodes’s statements demonstrate Coleman was not involved | Respondent: Barnes’s accounts changed repeatedly, conflict with physical evidence, and he had bias; Rhodes’s report is ambiguous and depends on Barnes’s credibility | Held: Courts may disbelieve Barnes; his inconsistency and bias undermine Rhodes’s testimony as exculpatory evidence |
| Reliability of alibi evidence from Loretta and Evelynn Cade | Coleman: Loretta and her mother place Coleman at Loretta’s parents’ home at time of murder | Respondent: Cade testimony is implausible, internally inconsistent, and biased (family member) | Held: Cades’ statements lack credibility and are unlikely to convince reasonable jurors |
| Impact of Wilkins brothers’ failure to identify Coleman | Coleman: Wilkins non‑identifications undermine trial eyewitness identifications | Respondent: Wilkins statements do not outweigh strong, consistent identifications by Adamson and Thomas plus Wright’s corroboration | Held: Wilkins’ non‑identifications helpful but insufficient to overcome eyewitness IDs and other inculpatory evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (sets demanding actual‑innocence gateway standard to excuse procedural default)
- McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) (clarifies actual‑innocence standard in habeas context)
- House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (requires consideration of all evidence, old and new, in assessing innocence gateway)
- O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (procedural default doctrine requiring presentation to state courts)
- Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (factors for assessing reliability of eyewitness identification)
- United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (witness bias can affect credibility)
- Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374 (7th Cir.) (example where new witness statements failed to overcome trial eyewitness IDs)