Maureen O'Connell v. William Walmsley v. Tapco, Inc.
93 A.3d 60
| R.I. | 2014

Background

  • Late-night collision (March 9, 2003) on New London Turnpike, Coventry: two young passengers (Goffe and Roberti) killed when a Toyota driven by Jason Goffe spun into the eastbound lane and struck William Walmsley’s oncoming vehicle. Plaintiffs are co-administrators of Roberti’s estate.
  • Prior to the crash, witnesses described high speeds and apparent racing between the Toyota and a pickup; the Toyota lost control and entered the eastbound lane before impact.
  • Walmsley had a post-accident BAC above the legal limit (.106% at hospital; estimated ~.117% at time of crash), testified he did not see approaching headlights and applied no brakes or evasive action.
  • Plaintiffs presented eyewitnesses, two accident-reconstruction experts, and a toxicology expert; jury found Walmsley negligent and apportioned fault: Walmsley 3%, Goffe 94%, Petrarca 3%, and awarded $10,000 in damages (pre-apportionment).
  • Trial court granted Walmsley’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding plaintiffs failed to prove proximate causation because the record lacked precise roadway distances/timing showing Walmsley had time to react; trial court also indicated it would grant an additur/new trial if its JML was reversed.
  • Supreme Court reviewed de novo and vacated the Superior Court’s JML, holding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence (intoxication, speed, failure to brake, conflicting eyewitness testimony about when the Toyota entered the eastbound lane) for a reasonable jury to find Walmsley’s negligence a contributing cause.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the trial justice erred by granting judgment as a matter of law on proximate causation Sufficient circumstantial evidence (BAC, speed, no braking, eyewitness accounts of the Toyota entering Walmsley’s lane while Walmsley could have seen it) permitted a reasonable jury to apportion fault to Walmsley Plaintiffs failed to prove causation because no witness or physical evidence established where/when the Toyota entered Walmsley’s lane relative to Walmsley’s position or distance to permit braking/evasion Reversed: viewing evidence in plaintiffs’ favor, reasonable inferences support that Walmsley’s intoxication, speed, and failure to react could have contributed to the collision; JML improperly invaded the jury’s province
Whether lack of precise roadway measurements/timing was fatal to plaintiffs’ causation proof Lack of exact measurements does not preclude causation when other credible circumstantial evidence allows reasonable inference of negligence and causation Without concrete distances/timelines, any apportionment is speculative and legally insufficient Rejected: Court held precise reference points were not required; trial justice overemphasized their absence and improperly weighed evidence

Key Cases Cited

  • McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271 (R.I. 2012) (standard of review for JML is de novo; view evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
  • Medeiros v. Sitrin, 984 A.2d 620 (R.I. 2009) (jury questions must be submitted when reasonable people could draw different conclusions)
  • Oliveira v. Jacobson, 846 A.2d 822 (R.I. 2004) (deference to nonmoving party when reviewing JML)
  • Gianquitti v. Atwood Medical Associates, 973 A.2d 580 (R.I. 2009) (proximate cause ordinarily a jury question; inference-based proof allowed)
  • DeChristofaro v. Machala, 685 A.2d 258 (R.I. 1996) (issues that reasonable jurors could decide preclude JML)
  • Franco v. Latina, 916 A.2d 1251 (R.I. 2007) (trial justice may not weigh evidence or assess credibility when granting JML)
  • Calise v. Curtain, 900 A.2d 1164 (R.I. 2006) (same limitation on trial-judge factfinding on JML)
  • Allen v. State, 420 A.2d 70 (R.I. 1980) (wrongful-death plaintiff must show causal relationship between defendant’s conduct and death)
  • Evans v. Liguori, 374 A.2d 774 (R.I. 1977) (causation principles in negligence/wrongful-death actions)
  • Seide v. State, 875 A.2d 1259 (R.I. 2005) (proximate cause cannot rest on mere speculation, but may be proved circumstantially)
  • Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 2001) (circumstantial evidence can establish proximate cause)
  • Oddo v. Cardi, 218 A.2d 373 (R.I. 1966) (oncoming vehicle crossing center line: defendant’s duty may include taking evasive action when peril is observable seconds before collision)
  • Schenck v. Roger Williams Gen. Hosp., 382 A.2d 514 (R.I. 1978) (what constitutes proximate cause is ordinarily for the jury)
  • Rodrigues v. Miriam Hosp., 623 A.2d 456 (R.I. 1993) (duty questions are for the court; breach and proximate cause are for the factfinder)
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