425 S.W.3d 85
Ky. Ct. App.2013Background
- Mattingly, an on‑duty Louisville Metro Police Officer, pursued a speeding BMW on the Watterson Expressway.
- Sutherland, also on duty, did not join the pursuit due to SOP concerns and positioned at Taylor Boulevard with lights on.
- The BMW exited the expressway, reentered the road, and collided with Cowan’s vehicle, killing Latonia Mitchell.
- Mattingly was found guilty of misconduct for violating SOPs governing pursuits; he was suspended, later reduced to five days.
- Estate of Latonia Mitchell sued Mattingly in his individual and official capacities for negligence and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process claims; Mattingly moved for summary judgment.
- Circuit Court denied summary judgment on proximate-cause issue but granted it on sovereign immunity and some § 1983 grounds; estate cross-appealed on the immunity ruling and related issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the denial of qualified official immunity is appealable immediately | Mattingly: immunity denial is immediately appealable. | Estate: relies on final judgment rule; not applicable to immunity denial. | Yes; denial of qualified official immunity is immediately appealable. |
| Whether Mattingly’s pursuit was the proximate cause of the collision | Estate contends pursuit caused the accident; summary judgment appropriate where proximate cause shown. | Mattingly asserts disputed facts; immunity analysis controls; causation not proven as a matter of law. | Issue not reviewable on appeal under CR 54.01; remanded for circuit court proceedings (not reached on appeal). |
| Whether the circuit court properly denied summary judgment on proximate-cause and other related grounds | Estate argued there were material issues of fact precluding summary judgment. | Mattingly contends no proximate-cause issue as a matter of law under the record. | Not subject to review on this interlocutory appeal under CR 54.01. |
| Whether Mattingly’s actions during the pursuit were discretionary or ministerial for immunity purposes | Mattingly’s discretion in initiating/continuing pursuit is limited by SOPs; deviation shows ministerial conduct. | Mattingly’s pursuit is discretionary in nature, invoking immunity. | Mattingly’s actions during the pursuit were not discretionary; SOPs controlled conduct, so no immunity. |
| Whether the Estate’s cross-appeal is reviewable under CR 54.01 | Estate seeks protective cross-appeal to preserve issues if immunity reverses. | Because immunity is affirmed, cross-appeal partially mooted; CR 54.01 precludes review. | CR 54.01 precludes review of the cross-appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883 (Ky. 2009) (immediate appeal of denial of substantial immunity claim)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (immunity denial as immediately appealable)
- Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (immunity doctrine and appellate review)
- Jones v. Lathram, 150 S.W.3d 50 (Ky. 2004) (driving a police cruiser in pursuit not always discretionary)
- Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001) (discretionary vs ministerial act; dominant nature test)
- Haney v. Monsky, 311 S.W.3d 235 (Ky. 2010) (helmet-rule enforcement as ministerial; objective standard)
- Upchurch v. Clinton County, 330 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1959) (facts dictate whether act is discretionary vs ministerial)
- Walker v. Davis, 643 F.Supp.2d 921 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (pursuit initiation/continuation discretionary but not controlling in KY)
- Gumm v. Combs, 302 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1957) (summary-judgment standard and appellate review)