Matthews v. Wisconsin Energy Corp., Inc., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10927

Matthews and Wisconsin Energy Corp. (WEC) signed a confidential settlement with a reference-check provision governing disclosures to prospective employers.
The policy limited information to confirmation of employment dates, salary, and position, excluding subjective performance remarks.
Matthews later sued in 2005 alleging breach of the reference-provision; Schwartz, a Ticket to Work program consultant, assisted Matthews in job searching and communications with WEC.
Schwartz contacted WEC on Matthews' behalf; Matthews later released information to Schwartz via a CIRA; a release form was not initially included with the reference request.
English, WEC’s in-house counsel, advised Schwartz that a release was required and that WEC would provide only basic information if a release was not included; Matthews was still widely represented by Heins.
A jury found no breach on remand, and the district court awarded WEC substantial attorney’s fees and costs under the settlement agreement’s fee-shifting provision.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Waiver instruction was proper	Matthews argues waiver instruction improperly allowed unilateral waiver.	WEC contends waiver was proper as agency conduct and unilateral disclosure.	Waiver instruction upheld; not reversible error.
Breach and damages should have been bifurcated	Need for separate findings on breach before damages.	The overall instruction aligns with Wisconsin breach elements; bifurcation not required.	No abuse; proper to consider together in context.
Agency instruction supported by evidence	Schwartz was not Matthews' agent; no agency relationship.	Evidence could support Schwartz acting as Matthews' agent for the reference request.	Agency instruction supported; jury could find Schwartz acted as Matthews' agent.
Award of attorney's fees and costs was proper	Fees were excessive and poorly documented; not commercially reasonable.	Under the Agreement, prevailing party recovers reasonable fees; fees were commercially reasonable.	Affirmed; fees deemed commercially reasonable under the Agreement; even unsuccessful motions can be recoverable.
Second summary judgment motion fees	Fees for the second summary judgment were not recoverable since WEC did not prevail on that motion.	Metavante allows recovery where claims arise from a common core of facts; some losses do not bar overall prevailing status.	No error; WEC entitled to fees for those proceedings as prevailing party on overarching action.

Matthews v. Wis. Energy Corp., Inc., 534 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2008) (remand for breach-of-contract issue; prior appellate decision)
Cruz v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 275 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2001) (standard for reviewing jury verdicts in light of the evidence)
Herremans v. Carrera Designs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1118 (7th Cir. 1998) (forfeiture of affirmative defenses not automatic; prejudice required)
Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (prejudice standard in evidentiary rulings; context for trial decisions)
Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 200 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1999) (contractual fee-shifting standard: commercially reasonable fees)
Balcor Real Estate Holdings, Inc. v. Walentas-Phoenix Corp., 73 F.3d 150 (7th Cir. 1996) (commercial reasonableness of fees; no detailed hour-by-hour review)
Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Savings Bank, 619 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2010) (prevailing-party fee recovery where claims share a core of facts)
Kallman v. Radioshack Corp., 315 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2002) (evidence of commercial reasonableness in fee decisions)
Northwestern Motor Car, Inc. v. Pope, 187 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 1971) (Wisconsin breach/damages framework cited in Wisconsin law)
Lynch v. Belden & Co., Inc., 882 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1989) (holistic view of jury instructions; context in evaluating instruction adequacy)