Matthews v. Parker
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13091
| 6th Cir. | 2011Background
- Matthews murdered his wife and mother-in-law in June 1981 in Kentucky, firing a .22 revolver from about eighteen inches away.
- At trial, the burden for EED under Kentucky law evolved over time; pre-Wellman the absence of EED was treated as an element, later cases shifted the burden, and the defense introduced EED evidence through psychiatrist Dr. Chutkow.
- The trial proceeded in culpability and penalty phases; Matthews was convicted of both murders and burglary, and sentenced to death for the murders.
- Post-conviction proceedings began in state court, leading to vacatur and appellate/ collateral review; federal habeas petitions followed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after AEDPA.
- The district court denied habeas relief in part and granted a certificate on certain claims; the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, granting relief on EED burden-shifting and prosecutorial misconduct, while denying others.
- Key issues on review include whether EED was an element that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and whether trial/appellate counsel were ineffective.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was EED an element of murder at the time, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt? | Matthews contends EED was an element and the state failed to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. | Parker argues state law did not place the burden on the defense to negate EED and that the jury was properly instructed. | Yes; the state failed to prove absence of EED beyond a reasonable doubt, violating Winship. |
| Did prosecutorial misconduct deny due process in closing arguments about EED? | Matthews argues the prosecutor denigrated EED and implying collusion with counsel and doctor. | Parker asserts the remarks were not plainly improper and not flagrant. | Yes; the remarks were improper and flagrant, rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. |
| Were trial counsel's penalty-phase investigations and presentation of mitigation evidence ineffective? | Matthews asserts counsel failed to uncover substantial mitigating evidence (family mental illness, alcoholism, abuse, etc.). | Parker contends counsel conducted substantial investigation; strategic decisions favored presenting EED as mitigation. | Partially; counsels’ mitigation investigation was not deficient in all respects, but some deficiencies were found and some strategic choices given deference. |
| Did appellate counsel render ineffective assistance for failing to raise EED-definition issues on direct appeal? | Matthews argues omission of challenging Kentucky’s EED undefined framework was ineffective. | Parker argues the omission was not objectively stronger and was a strategic choice under Mapes factors. | No; appellate counsel's performance did not fall below reasonable standards. |
| Did Kentucky's failure to define EED render the statute void for vagueness under due process? | Matthews contends undefined EED was unconstitutional and retroactive application would harm defendants. | Parker asserts undefined EED was permissible under precedent and not unconstitutionally vague. | No; undefined EED did not violate due process given then-current authority. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (Supreme Court, 1970) (requires proof of every element beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Gall v. Commonwealth (Gall I), 607 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1980) ( Commonwealth burden on EED; initial allocation of burden)
- Gall v. Parker (Gall II), 231 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2000) (retroactivity and Bouie concerns; EED burden framework)
- Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (Supreme Court, 1964) (retroactivity; unforeseen judicial expansions invalid if retroactive)
- Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1985) (absence of EED not an element of murder; overruled later precedents)
- McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1986) (definition of EED in Kentucky context)
- Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 2006) (mitigating evidence; limits to admissibility; weighing safeguards)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (Supreme Court, 2001) (Bouie cited; ex post facto considerations; foreseeability)