Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Independent School District
484 S.W.3d 416
| Tex. | 2016Background
- Kountze ISD banned student banners with religious messages at school-sponsored events after a complaint; middle/high school cheerleaders (through parents) sued claiming violations of free speech and free exercise under the Texas Constitution.
- District filed a plea to the jurisdiction (governmental immunity, standing) and later argued mootness after adopting Resolution and Order No. 3, which permits "fleeting expressions" of community sentiment even if religious but reserves content control over banners.
- Trial court denied the District’s plea; the court of appeals held most claims moot (except attorney’s fees) because the District voluntarily ceased the ban.
- Plaintiffs sought review in the Texas Supreme Court, which granted review to decide whether voluntary cessation rendered the claims moot.
- The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the District’s conditional policy change did not make it "absolutely clear" the conduct could not recur, so claims for prospective relief are not moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness from voluntary cessation | Cheerleaders: District’s policy change does not eliminate need for declaratory/injunctive relief because District may reinstate ban | District: Adoption of Resolution No. 3 removed the ban and thus moots prospective claims | Not moot — defendant must show it is "absolutely clear" the conduct cannot recur; District did not do so |
| Scope of challenged conduct | Cheerleaders: Challenge ongoing policy treating banners as government speech | District: Challenge limited to discrete Sept. 18, 2012 announcement | Court did not decide scope; held mootness analysis succeeds even assuming discrete action was challenged, and still not moot |
| Standard for establishing mootness after voluntary cessation | Plaintiffs: Defendant must admit illegality or provide a permanent, unambiguous cessation | Defendant: Temporary or conditional cessation suffices to moot case | Court: Heavy burden on defendant; must show it is "absolutely clear" conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur |
| Whether court should dismiss to avoid advisory opinions | Plaintiffs: Judicial declaration needed to prevent future recurrence and settle public rights | Defendant: Dismissal appropriate to avoid advisory rulings when policy changed | Court: Declined dismissal; jurisdiction remains because controversy may recur without a binding judicial determination |
Key Cases Cited
- Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) (mootness doctrine and standard of appellate review)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2000) (voluntary cessation doctrine: must be "absolutely clear" conduct cannot recur)
- County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (U.S. 1979) (defendant bears heavy burden to prove mootness by voluntary cessation)
- Bexar Metro. Water Dist. v. City of Bulverde, 234 S.W.3d 126 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007) (voluntary policy change without admission or permanent assurance does not moot challenge)
- Lakey v. Taylor ex rel. Shearer, 278 S.W.3d 6 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008) (defendant’s failure to admit unconstitutionality can preclude mootness)
- Texas Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002) (state’s withdrawal of threatened enforcement did not render case moot absent assurance against recurrence)
- United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (U.S. 1953) (voluntary cessation does not automatically deprive court of jurisdiction)
- Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. 2000) (courts must avoid issuing advisory opinions)
- Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 863 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993) (voluntary cessation not sufficient without admission or judicial determination)