Matthew T Thiel v. David L Goyings
939 N.W.2d 152
Mich.2019Background
- Timber Ridge Bay subdivision deed covenants barred "pre-fabricated or modular homes" and required all residences to be "stick built on site."
- David and Helen Goyings contracted builders who used a hybrid, "systems-built" method: three factory-built modules delivered and craned onto a foundation, with remaining work built on site. Completed home ≈ 59% stick-built, 41% modular components.
- Neighbors (Thiel and Traywick) sued to enjoin completion and to require removal of modular components as violating the covenants. Trial court found the home indistinguishable from site-built and allowed it to remain.
- Court of Appeals reversed, holding the home violated the unambiguous prohibition on modular homes and that injunctive removal was required.
- Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: it defined "modular home" in covenant context as a home that is predominantly modular, concluded the Goyingses’ home was predominantly stick-built, and reinstated the trial court's dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| How to interpret "modular home" in the covenants | "Modular home" means any dwelling composed of standardized/prefabricated units; the Goyingses' house is modular | "Modular home" should be read in context; only homes that are predominantly modular or wholly prefabricated are prohibited | The phrase must be read in context; a "modular home" is one that is predominantly modular (more modular than not). The Goyingses' home is not predominantly modular. |
| Whether modules delivered were a "relocated residence" or "manufactured housing unit" under covenants | Modules constituted a residence when delivered or a manufactured unit, triggering categorical prohibitions | Modules were raw construction components requiring substantial on-site work and were not complete residences or manufactured homes | Modules were not a residence on delivery and the home was not a "manufactured housing unit" as used in the covenants. |
| Whether the covenants must be enforced by mandatory injunction (removal) whenever breached | Plaintiffs: enforcement by injunction required; removal appropriate because violation clear | Defendants: trial court has equitable discretion; injunctive removal may be inappropriate given circumstances | Majority: not necessary here because no violation; concurring opinion emphasized that issuance of injunction is discretionary and Cooper does not limit equitable defenses to only three categories. |
| Role of external professional characterizations (permits, appraisals, inspections) | Such characterizations show the home was modular and support injunction | Those labels show modules existed but do not resolve whether home is predominantly modular under covenant language | Court gave limited weight to professional labels because they did not answer the contextual legal question of predominance under the covenant language. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cooper v. Kovan, 349 Mich 520 (1957) (discussed equitable exceptions to injunction enforcement of covenants; Court clarifies Cooper does not narrowly limit equitable discretion)
- Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich 56 (2002) (restrictive-covenant interpretation focuses on drafter's intent; doubts resolved for free use of property)
- Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. Birmingham, 479 Mich 206 (2007) (unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced as written)
- Stuart v. Chawney, 454 Mich 200 (1997) (scope of restrictive-covenant enforcement; emphasize contract principles)
- Oosterhouse v. Brummel, 343 Mich 283 (1955) (equity courts exercise discretion whether to grant injunction enforcing covenants; remedies depend on all circumstances)
- Tabern v. Gates, 231 Mich 581 (1925) (court should seek restrictor’s intent over strict syntax when construing restrictions)