Matthew S. Bovee v. Houston Press LLP, Margaret Downing, Dianna Wray, Peter Ryan, Dallas Observer, LLP, KXAN, Dawn Denny, Patrick Williams, Media General Inc., Voice Media Group, Does 1 Through 5, and Jane Doe, 10-15-00346-CV

Background

Plaintiff Matthew Bovee, a prison inmate, sued alleging others conspired to publish defamatory articles about him; the articles used a pseudonym "Johnny Doe," but Bovee named Johnny and his family in his court filings.
Johnny (a non-party) moved to seal court records to protect his identity and emotional well-being.
The trial court held a hearing and issued an order redacting Johnny’s name and any names that would tend to identify him from all pleadings and prohibiting future pleadings that would identify Johnny.
Bovee sought a bench warrant to appear in person at the sealing hearing; he ultimately participated by telephone.
Bovee appealed, raising issues about the denial (implicit) of the bench warrant, the sealing order’s duration, the court’s in camera review of documents, sufficiency/abuse of discretion, and alleged waiver of privacy under Rule 511.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Bench warrant/presence at hearing	Bovee argued he was entitled to a bench warrant so he could testify and oppose the sealing motion in person	Trial court allowed telephone participation and Bovee did not show necessity for in-person presence or facts justifying a bench warrant	Court affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion in implicitly denying the bench warrant because Bovee failed to justify necessity under inmate-presence standards (In the Interest of Z.L.T.)
Duration of sealing order under Rule 76a(6)	Bovee argued the order failed to state a proper time period and that an open-ended phrase (“From the date of this Order forward”) is improper	Trial court argued that phrase does state a time period and Rule 76a provides mechanisms for later modification or termination	Court affirmed: the language constitutes a stated time period under Rule 76a(6); Boardman distinguished and Rule 76a(7) allows later intervention/modification
In camera review / ex parte claim	Bovee claimed documents submitted for in camera inspection were not served and thus were considered ex parte	Johnny’s counsel presented documents at the hearing when parties were present; court inspected them privately as permitted by Rule 76a	Court affirmed: in camera inspection was proper and not ex parte because the hearing occurred with parties present and Bovee participated by phone
Sufficiency / abuse of discretion standard	Bovee contended evidence did not support sealing order	Johnny argued trial court acted within discretion to protect a nonparty’s privacy and identity	Court affirmed: review is for abuse of discretion (General Tire standard); Bovee failed to show the trial court abused its discretion and the issue was inadequately briefed
Waiver of privacy via voluntary disclosure (Rule 511)	Bovee argued Johnny waived privacy by disclosing identity and Rule 511 triggered waiver	Johnny argued Rule 511 governs evidentiary privileges and does not apply to the asserted constitutional privacy interest; disclosure alleged was not of the identity at issue	Court affirmed: Rule 511 governs evidentiary privilege waiver and does not establish waiver of constitutional privacy here; Bovee offered no controlling authority to the contrary

Key Cases Cited

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (prisoners are not denied access to courts solely because they are inmates; but presence in court is not absolute)
In the Interest of Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2003) (inmate’s right to be physically present must be justified and balanced against prison security)
Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1998) (abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review)
Boardman v. Elm Block Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 872 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1994) (sealing orders must be tied to stated reasons; court distinguished on facts)