Matthew R. Gouldsmith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 55A01-1605-CR-1022

Gouldsmith, who knew a teenage girl (M.B.) through his son, engaged in repeated sexual acts with her from 2012–2013 beginning when she was under 15 and continuing through age 15; sexual activity included vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse and exchange of nude photos; he also photographed her through a cracked door on two occasions.
He was charged in 2014 with multiple counts; the State proceeded to trial on three counts of Sexual Misconduct with a Minor (Class B), one count of Child Exploitation (Class C), and two counts of Voyeurism (Class D).
A jury convicted Gouldsmith of the listed counts after a January 2016 trial; the court sentenced him to an aggregate 31 years with 11 years suspended to probation, including special probation conditions restricting access to sexually oriented businesses and sexual relationships with persons who have children under 16 without permission.
On appeal Gouldsmith raised two principal challenges: (1) that the trial court erred by denying certain for-cause juror challenges, and (2) that particular probation conditions (Terms 12 and 17) were overbroad/vague and unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, held Gouldsmith waived appellate review of the for-cause challenges for failure to make an adequate record of peremptory exhaustion, but reversed/remanded portions of the probation order as overbroad or vague and requiring clarification.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Trial court denial of for-cause juror challenges	State: trial court acted within discretion; defendant failed to preserve error	Gouldsmith: denial of for-cause challenges forced him to accept objectionable jurors after exhausting peremptories	Waived: Gouldsmith failed to make a contemporaneous record that he had exhausted peremptories and was forced to accept juror 40, so appellate review is barred
Validity of probation Term 12 (ban on obscene matter, child porn, adult businesses, "businesses that sell sexual devices or aids")	State: terms reasonably related to supervision and law‑enforcement needs; intended to bar sexually arousing establishments	Gouldsmith: provision is vague and overbroad, infringes associational and privacy interests	Partially reversed: ban on “businesses that sell sexual devices or aids” is unconstitutionally vague (per Collins) and must be clarified; bans on adult bookstores/strip clubs/motels upheld as reasonable
Validity of probation Term 17 (no sexual relationship with persons who have children under 16 without court/treatment permission)	State: restriction reasonably reduces access to children and furthers supervision	Gouldsmith: overly broad and vague; could criminalize incidental encounters and lacks notice	Reversed in part: term is overly broad as written and must be clarified to give adequate notice and workable scope

Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 241 (Ind. 2014) (standard/deference for for-cause juror rulings and exhaustion rule)
Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24 (Ind. 2012) (exhaustion of peremptories and preservation requirements)
Merritt v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 765 N.E.2d 1232 (Ind. 2002) (need to make record of inability to use additional peremptories to preserve appellate review)
Collins v. State, 911 N.E.2d 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (probation prohibition on “businesses that sell sexual devices or aids” found unconstitutionally vague)
Patton v. State, 990 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (probation conditions judged by balancing purpose of probation, probationers’ reduced constitutional rights, and law enforcement needs)
McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (probation conditions limiting access to children may be reasonable)
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Fourteenth Amendment protection for certain intimate personal decisions)