Matthew Jordan, Sr. v. City of Memphis, W2015-01994-COA-R3-CV

Background

In July 2006 the Memphis Pension Board voted at a meeting to deny police officer Matthew Jordan, Sr.’s application for line-of-duty disability benefits. The minutes of that meeting (signed but undated and with an unclear approval/filing date) were included in the administrative record.
Jordan filed a petition for writ of certiorari in chancery court on October 27, 2006, supported by a notarized oath but omitting the statutory recitation that it was “the first application for the writ.”
The City delayed filing an answer until 2011 and then moved to dismiss based on the missing statutory recitation (Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-106), arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the City later also argued, for the first time on appeal, that the petition was untimely.
The chancery court dismissed Jordan’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the petition did not state it was the first application for the writ and denied leave to amend.
On appeal the Court of Appeals reviewed subject matter jurisdiction de novo and concluded the timeliness (whether the 60-day judicial-review period began to run) had to be resolved before addressing the § 27-8-106 recitation issue.
Because the record did not show when the Board’s decision was “entered” (the minutes’ approval/filing date or other ministerial act that would constitute entry), the court vacated the dismissal and remanded for the trial court to determine when (if ever) the Board’s decision was entered and whether Jordan’s petition was timely.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether failure to state the petition was the "first application for the writ" deprives court of subject matter jurisdiction	Jordan: statutory recitation is not jurisdictional and can be cured by amendment	City: omission is jurisdictional and requires dismissal	Court did not decide; remanded to decide timeliness first because jurisdiction depends on when the 60-day period began
When did the 60-day period to seek review begin (rendition vs. entry of Board decision)?	Jordan: time began when the minutes were approved (entry)	City: time began at the July 27, 2006 meeting when Board voted (rendition)	Court: vote alone is rendition; something more (e.g., filing/approval of minutes) is needed to establish entry — record insufficient, remand to determine date of entry
Whether the petition was timely filed	Jordan: filed within 60 days of entry (once entry date established)	City: petition was filed after 60 days from decision (untimely)	Court: cannot resolve on present record; remand to determine entry date and timeliness
Whether trial court properly dismissed without allowing amendment	Jordan: should have been allowed to amend to add the statutory recitation	City: dismissal appropriate if jurisdictional defect	Court: did not resolve; dismissal vacated because timeliness must be resolved first and record inadequate to decide entry/timeliness

Key Cases Cited

Dishmon v. Shelby State Cmty. Coll., 15 S.W.3d 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction requires dismissal)
First Am. Trust Co. v. Franklin-Murray Dev. Co., 59 S.W.3d 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (vacating judgment when trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction)
Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727 (Tenn. 2000) (subject matter jurisdiction reviewed de novo)
Jackson v. Jarratt, 52 S.W.2d 137 (Tenn. 1932) (distinguishing rendition of judgment from entry)
Carter v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 377 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. 1964) (entry as ministerial act providing enduring evidence of rendition)
Grigsby v. City of Plainview, 194 S.W.3d 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (vote alone insufficient for entry; remand where record did not show when minutes were filed/approved)
Blair v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 246 S.W.3d 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (timeliness of petition can be jurisdictional bar)
Talley v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 358 S.W.3d 185 (Tenn. 2011) (procedural context for addressing jurisdictional issues)
Davis v. Tenn. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (time for judicial review runs from entry of agency’s final order)