Matthew Green v. DOJ, 111 F.4th 81

The plaintiffs, a computer science professor and a technology inventor, challenged key provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), specifically Section 1201's anticircumvention and antitrafficking rules, as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
The DMCA was enacted to prevent digital piracy by prohibiting circumvention of technological protection measures ("digital locks") on copyrighted works and the trafficking in tools that enable such circumvention.
The statute includes built-in exemptions (both statutory and through a triennial rulemaking process), intended to ensure that noninfringing and fair uses are not unduly burdened.
Plaintiffs abandoned their as-applied challenges and instead argued on appeal that Section 1201 is facially overbroad and constitutes a prior restraint on speech.
The district court dismissed their facial and Administrative Procedure Act claims but allowed the as-applied ones to proceed; after losing on those issues, plaintiffs brought this appeal on the facial issues only.
The D.C. Circuit reviewed the facial First Amendment challenges de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff’s Argument	Defendant’s Argument	Held
Overbreadth of DMCA Section 1201	Section 1201 is overbroad, chilling a substantial amount of protected speech.	Section 1201 regulates conduct, not speech, and its lawful scope is extensive.	Section 1201 is not facially overbroad; lawful applications predominate.
First Amendment Right to Circumvent	All fair use is First Amendment-protected, so circumvention for fair use cannot be barred.	No such right exists; First Amendment does not guarantee privileged access to works.	DMCA does not unconstitutionally burden fair use or expressive conduct.
Triennial Rulemaking as Prior Restraint	Exemption scheme operates as an unlawful speech-licensing regime.	The regime targets conduct, not content, and lacks censorial risks of prior restraint.	Not a prior restraint; regime regulates conduct, not speech.
Content/Speaker Discrimination in Exemptions	Exemptions discriminate between types of speech or speakers (e.g., documentary filmmakers v. narrative).	Exemptions are generally applicable, content-neutral, and reviewed regularly.	No showing of content-based discrimination; challenge fails.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (fair use and idea/expression dichotomy as First Amendment safeguards in copyright law)
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (copyright law as an engine of free expression and scope of fair use)
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding DMCA anticircumvention provisions against First Amendment challenge)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (overbreadth doctrine requires substantial disproportion of unlawful applications)
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (facial prior restraint doctrine applies to schemes closely tied to expression)
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (foundational prior restraint doctrine)