Matthew Friedson v. State
207 So. 3d 961
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Detectives went to Friedson’s ground-floor apartment to investigate a battery and had intelligence he sold marijuana and was deaf. They knocked; no answer.
- Detectives moved from the front porch to an area directly in front of a window adjacent to the door, shone flashlights, banged on the window, and saw Friedson inside. They also texted him; he did not respond.
- After stepping to the window area, an air-conditioner activated and Detective Tice testified he smelled marijuana coming from the unit. The detectives left, located the apartment manager, and had the manager unlock the door. Inside, detectives interviewed Friedson (via written questions); he refused consent to search.
- Detective Tice sought and obtained a warrant (the affidavit relied in part on the odor of marijuana). A search yielded ~20 grams of marijuana packaged for sale and paraphernalia.
- Expert and manager testimony disputed that the AC could blow interior air outside; the trial court credited the detectives and denied the motion to suppress. Friedson pled nolo contendere reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Fifth DCA reversed and ordered vacatur of judgment and sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Friedson) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether detectives exceeded the scope of a knock‑and‑talk and entered curtilage when they moved off the porch to the window area | Detectives left the porch and lingered on private curtilage (window area), exceeding the implied license to knock | The window area was a shared/common area not protected as curtilage; detectives were lawfully positioned | Court: detectives exceeded the implied license; area was curtilage and their conduct was impermissible |
| Whether the odor of marijuana detected at that location could support warrantless intrusion or plain‑smell/plain‑view doctrine | The odor was detected while officers were in a constitutionally protected area, so plain‑smell cannot justify use of that observation | The plain smell doctrine applies because officers were lawfully located and would have smelled from the porch | Court: plain‑smell did not apply because officers were not legitimately in the curtilage where the odor was detected |
| Whether inclusion of the odor observation in the warrant affidavit was harmless because affidavit contained other valid allegations | The odor was a key basis for probable cause; it was tainted by the illegal intrusion and poisoned the affidavit | Even if illegally obtained, the affidavit had other sufficient allegations to establish probable cause | Court: the warrant relied on unlawfully obtained evidence; evidence obtained under the warrant was fruit of the poisonous tree and inadmissible |
| Whether the apartment manager’s unlocking/opening the door cured any defect or provided independent lawful entry | Manager acted as a private actor but was effectively an instrument of the State because detectives directed her to open the door | The manager’s action was private and created lawful access independent of prior intrusion | Court: ordering the manager to open the door was government‑involved and improper; state action cannot cure the earlier illegality |
Key Cases Cited
- Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (U.S. 1951) (knock on door treated as implied license to approach home)
- Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (U.S. 2013) (license to approach home is limited; exploring curtilage exceeds implied license)
- Powell v. State, 120 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (stepping off porch a few feet into curtilage to peer through window exceeded knock‑and‑talk)
- Ferrer v. State, 113 So. 3d 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (plain‑smell doctrine applies only where officers occupy a place they have a legitimate right to be)
- Hunwick v. State, 434 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (illegally obtained evidence included in an affidavit does not invalidate a warrant if affidavit contains other valid allegations)
- Neary v. State, 384 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1980) (same principle regarding sufficiency of affidavit despite inclusion of tainted information)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1963) (‘‘fruit of the poisonous tree’’ doctrine)
- Batista v. State, 524 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in shared common areas of an apartment building)
- Luna‑Martinez v. State, 984 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (knock‑and‑talk must avoid coercive or overbearing police conduct)