Matthew Eric Kershner v. Samsung Austin Semiconductor, LLC
03-15-00529-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 8, 2015Background
- Plaintiff (Kershner) was an employee of Spur Electric and alleged a workplace injury on Samsung Austin Semiconductor's (SAS) Saturn Project.
- SAS implemented a mandatory Owner Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) covering contractors; Spur enrolled, executed an Enrollment Worksheet expressly memorializing coverage under Tex. Lab. Code § 406.123, and received OCIP certificates covering the injury date.
- SAS moved for traditional summary judgment invoking the workers' compensation exclusive-remedy/"deemed employer" rule under Tex. Lab. Code § 406.123; the trial court granted summary judgment for SAS.
- On appeal, plaintiff argues § 406.122 (which can exclude subcontractors from deemed-employee status if they both operate as independent contractors and have a qualifying written agreement) should prevent § 406.123 immunity from applying.
- SAS (appellee) concedes it satisfied § 406.123 and contends § 406.122 does not apply because the statutorily required written agreement is absent; SAS further argues plaintiff relies on a non-binding, unpublished outlier (TIC Energy) and failed to respond to multiple dispositive points below and on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of § 406.123 (deemed-employer/OCIP immunity) | Kershner implicitly concedes SAS satisfied § 406.123 but challenges immunity on other grounds | SAS satisfied § 406.123 in writing (Enrollment Worksheet, OCIP certificates) so it is a deemed employer and immune | Trial court granted summary judgment for SAS based on § 406.123; appellee urges affirmance |
| Whether § 406.122 defeats § 406.123 immunity | Kershner urges § 406.122 should apply (subcontractor not deemed employee) because Spur was an independent contractor | SAS: § 406.122 requires a written agreement evidencing assumption-of-employer-responsibilities; no such written agreement exists here, so § 406.122 is inapplicable | Appellee argues, and prior authority supports, that absence of the required written agreement means § 406.122 does not apply; summary judgment stands |
| Effect of TIC Energy (Corpus Christi, unpublished) | Plaintiff relies on TIC Energy to claim both statutes must be reconciled and § 406.122 can trump § 406.123 | SAS: TIC Energy is unpublished/nonbinding, narrowly decided (applies only when both statutes are triggered), and conflicts with controlling precedent | Appellee stresses TIC Energy is distinguishable and not controlling; court should not rely on it |
| Public policy / OCIP validity risk | Plaintiff's position would permit avoidance of OCIP immunity by unsupported assertions of independent-contractor status | SAS argues upholding immunity aligns with TWCA policy favoring coverage certainty, multi-tier OCIP effectiveness, and Supreme Court guidance | Appellee contends affirming summary judgment preserves OCIP functionality and consistent precedent; court should affirm |
Key Cases Cited
- Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. 2009) (premises owner/purchaser who provides OCIP coverage can be a deemed employer and immune from suit)
- HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2009) (Texas Supreme Court emphasizes legislative bias toward finding workers' compensation coverage and exclusive remedy)
- Wingfoot Enterprises v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. 2003) (discusses policy reasons for exclusive-remedy bar and construction of TWCA provisions)
- Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1996) (summary-judgment burdens — nonmovant must raise genuine fact issue to defeat movant)