69 F.4th 338
6th Cir.2023Background
- Plaintiff Matthew Dickson sued Direct Energy under the TCPA, alleging unsolicited ringless voicemails (RVMs) were deposited to his cell phone in 2017 without consent.
- Dickson testified he received eleven RVMs and that they invaded his privacy and were a nuisance; Direct Energy’s expert concluded only one RVM (Nov. 3, 2017) was from Direct Energy.
- The district court concluded Dickson received a single RVM and dismissed for lack of Article III standing, finding no concrete harm (no charges, no tied-up line, minimal interruption).
- On appeal the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether receipt of an unsolicited RVM can constitute a concrete injury under Spokeo and TransUnion.
- The Sixth Circuit held the alleged injury is the same kind of harm protected by the common-law tort of intrusion upon seclusion and aligns with the TCPA’s purpose.
- The court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, ruling standing exists regardless of whether Dickson received one or multiple RVMs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does receipt of a single RVM constitute a concrete Article III injury? | Receipt invaded privacy, was a nuisance, and imposed time/cost burdens. | A single, quietly deposited RVM caused no concrete harm: no charge, no interruption, minimal time spent. | Yes. An unsolicited RVM is an intangible but concrete harm analogous in kind to intrusion upon seclusion; standing exists. |
| Must a common-law analogue match in degree (substantiality) or only in kind? | A close analogue in kind suffices even if the intrusion is less substantial than classic common-law invasions. | Intrusion-upon-seclusion requires substantial, highly offensive invasions (e.g., repeated ringing); an isolated RVM is insufficient. | Kind, not degree: Spokeo/TransUnion require a close relationship in kind to a traditional harm, not an exact duplicate. |
| Does Congress’s judgment (TCPA) support recognizing the injury as concrete? | The TCPA was enacted to prevent exactly this sort of unsolicited automated voicemail intrusion. | (Not meaningfully disputed on appeal.) | Yes. The alleged conduct aligns with the TCPA’s purpose to protect privacy from unsolicited automated calls. |
| Is the district court’s factual finding that only one RVM was received dispositive of standing? | The number of RVMs does not change the standing analysis; factual disputes are for remand. | District court relied on its factual finding to deny standing. | Standing is satisfied regardless of whether one or multiple RVMs were received; remand required for further proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (Article III concreteness framework for intangible statutory harms)
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) (clarifies Spokeo and instructs courts to consider history/tradition and Congress’s judgment)
- Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020) (unsolicited automated texts akin in kind to intrusion upon seclusion)
- Ward v. NPAS, Inc., 63 F.4th 576 (6th Cir. 2023) (applies Gadelhak logic; one unwanted voicemail suffices for standing)
- Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017) (unsolicited calls/texts invade privacy and disturb solitude)
- Susinno v. Workout World, Inc., 862 F.3d 346 (3d Cir. 2017) (single prerecorded call can support standing)
- Cranor v. 5 Star Nutrition, L.L.C., 998 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 2021) (rejects Eleventh Circuit’s Salcedo approach)
- Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019) (contrasting view that an isolated text may be insufficient under Spokeo)