Matter of Till v. Apex Rehabilitation
144 A.D.3d 1231
| N.Y. App. Div. | 2016Background
- In 2012 claimant Janine Till, a nursing assistant, suffered compensable work-related injuries to her back and left shoulder.
- A WCLJ classified her with a permanent partial disability and found a 40% loss of wage-earning capacity.
- On administrative review the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed permanent partial disability but reduced loss of wage-earning capacity to 15%.
- Claimant appealed, arguing statutory conflict: WCL § 15(5-a) caps nonworking claimants’ wage-earning capacity at 75% of former earnings (implying at least a 25% loss), while WCL § 15(3)(w) (xi)/(xii) defines loss of wage-earning capacity for benefit duration.
- The Board relied on separate statutory roles for “wage-earning capacity” (rate calculation) and “loss of wage-earning capacity” (duration), and found substantial evidence supporting a 15% loss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether WCL § 15(5-a) (75% cap for nonworking claimants) prevents the Board from finding less than a 25% loss of wage-earning capacity under § 15(3)(w) | Till: the 75% cap on wage-earning capacity means nonworking claimants must have at least 25% loss, so Board cannot award <25% loss | Respondents/Board: § 15(5-a) governs rate calculations for unemployed claimants; § 15(3)(w) loss percentage governs duration — they are distinct and can yield <25% loss | Court: statutes harmonized; no conflict. §15(5-a) controls rate, §15(3)(w) controls duration; Board may find <25% loss if supported by evidence |
| Whether the Board must treat loss of wage-earning capacity as the inverse of wage-earning capacity for nonworking claimants | Till: loss should be inverse of wage-earning capacity for nonworking claimants | Board: loss and wage-earning capacity are separate concepts; inverse relation not required | Court: Not required; inverse relation unnecessary; defer to statutory text and intent |
| Whether the Board's 15% loss finding is supported by substantial evidence | Till: challenges the sufficiency | Board: relied on functional limitations, impairments, age, ongoing education/licensure efforts and state guidelines | Court: substantial evidence supports 15% loss |
| Whether prior Board interpretations requiring inverse relationship bind the court | Till: cites Board precedent | Respondents: court not bound by Board's previous statutory interpretations in pure statutory construction | Court: Court need not defer; interprets statute itself |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192 (statutory sections read together to harmonize meaning)
- Sanders v. Winship, 57 N.Y.2d 391 (statutes must be harmonized to effect legislative purpose)
- Heard v. Cuomo, 80 N.Y.2d 684 (same principle of statutory construction)
- Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 13 N.Y.3d 270 (court need not defer to agency interpretation on pure statutory issues)
- Matter of Canales v. Pinnacle Foods Group LLC, 117 A.D.3d 1271 (agency deference limitations)
- Matter of Roman v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 139 A.D.3d 1304 (substantial-evidence standard for Board findings)
- Matter of Wormley v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 126 A.D.3d 1257 (factors relevant to loss-of-wage-earning-capacity findings)
- Matter of Schirizzo v. Citibank NA–Banking, 128 A.D.3d 1293 (consideration of claimant’s age and rehabilitation efforts)
- Matter of Cameron v. Crooked Lake House, 106 A.D.3d 1416 (same)