Matte v. Caplan
140 So. 3d 686
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Plaintiff sued multiple defendants including appellant (Caplan) for tortious interference; appellant believed the complaint was frivolous and sought sanctions under Fla. Stat. § 57.105.
- § 57.105(4) requires a motion for sanctions to be served on the opposing party and not filed until 21 days after service (the "safe-harbor").
- On Feb 22, 2013 appellant’s counsel e-mailed an attached Word draft of a § 57.105 motion to plaintiff’s counsel, but did not follow Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 formatting requirements (no PDF or link, subject line lacked "SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT" and case number, body omitted required case/contact details).
- Appellant filed the motion two days after filing a motion to dismiss; plaintiff later amended the complaint to drop appellant, and the court reserved jurisdiction on the sanctions motion.
- Plaintiff objected that service did not comply with Rule 2.516; plaintiff’s counsel testified she actually received and read the Word attachment.
- The trial court denied the sanctions motion for failure to strictly comply with the e-mail service rule; appellant appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 57.105 safe-harbor service requirement can be satisfied by e-mail that does not strictly comply with Rule 2.516 | Service was deficient because the e-mail failed to meet mandatory Rule 2.516 formatting and attachment requirements | Substantial compliance sufficed because plaintiff actually received and read the motion (actual notice) | Strict compliance with Rule 2.516 is required before § 57.105 sanctions may be imposed; actual notice/substantial compliance insufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Lago v. Kame By Design, LLC, 120 So.3d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (describing § 57.105(4) as the safe-harbor provision)
- Anchor Towing, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 10 So.3d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (refused to treat actual notice as a substitute for statutory safe-harbor service)
- Montgomery v. Larmoyeux, 14 So.3d 1067 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (§ 57.105 is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed)
- Cano v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 8 So.3d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (discussing strict construction of fee-shifting provisions like Rule 1.442)
- Brower-Eger v. Noon, 994 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (same principle regarding strict construction of attorney-fee statutes)
- In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Jud. Admin. et al., 102 So.3d 505 (Fla. 2012) (adoption/description of mandatory e-mail service requirements in Rule 2.516)