Matlock, Marcus Dewayne
2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 433
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2013Background
- Matlock was judicially determined to be the father of a child and ordered to pay $191.40 monthly support, but repeatedly failed to pay.
- The State charged sixteen counts of nonsupport for months when payments were due from February 2006 to December 2008; the central issue was his ability to pay rather than willful nonpayment.
- Evidence showed Matlock was incarcerated for long periods and participated in rehabilitation programs; jail wages were unavailable or limited, and prior earnings were irregular.
- Matlock testified to a degree in electronics, sporadic work history, and lack of savings; he argued he could not pay due to addiction, unemployment, and limited income.
- The jury convicted on all counts, and on direct appeal the court of appeals acquitted Count I (shown as against the defense’s inability-to-pay) but upheld the remaining convictions; the court conflated legal and factual sufficiency standards.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the court of appeals erred by applying the Meraz factual-sufficiency standard to a legal-sufficiency question and by misapplying the standard for reviewing an affirmative defense; the case is remanded for proper review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What standard applies to legal sufficiency for an inability-to-pay defense? | Matlock: legal sufficiency should be reviewed under a preponderance standard. | State: apply the modified Sterner legal-sufficiency standard post-Keller. | Use the modified Sterner legal-sufficiency standard. |
| Is incarceration alone sufficient to prove inability to pay as a matter of law? | Matlock: imprisonment supports inability-to-pay evidence. | State: incarceration is not by itself conclusive; must be weighed with other evidence. | Incarceration alone is not dispositive; requires proper evaluative standard and evidence. |
| Should Meraz factual-sufficiency standard apply to reviewing the rejection of an affirmative defense? | State: Meraz factual sufficiency governs review of the defense. | Matlock: Meraz applies to factual sufficiency; all aspects must be considered. | Meraz factual-sufficiency standard applies to factual review of the defense; but legal sufficiency must be separately addressed. |
| Did the court of appeals properly distinguish between legal and factual sufficiency when reviewing the defense? | State: the court of appeals conflated standards and should have applied proper legal sufficiency analysis first. | Matlock: the appeals court correctly weighed evidence under Meraz. | Court of appeals erred by conflating standards; remand for proper analysis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (reaffirmed Jackson v. Virginia standard for legal sufficiency in criminal offenses)
- Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989) (two-step test for legal sufficiency when burden is preponderance)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (refined civil-standard review; influences criminal civil-sufficiency approach)
- Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (adopted civil standards of factual sufficiency for affirmative defenses)
- Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (rejected rigid criminal standard for affirmative defenses; set groundwork for Meraz)
- Ballard v. State, 161 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005) (discussed dual standards for affirmative defenses; later affirmed governing approach)
- Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001) (framework for legal-sufficiency review; guiding general approach)