Mateo Cortez, as Representative of the Estate of Deborah Cortez v. Sandra Flesher Brown, Charlotte Flesher Ash, Charlene Flesher Johnston, Connie Lou Keith Barry, Randall Wayne Davis, Virginia Villers, Charles Roberts, Lisa A. Smith, Patricia Chapman, Betty J. Marks Webb, James Berl Marks, Linda Murray, 03-17-00365-CV

Background

Mateo Cortez, as representative of the estate of Deborah Cortez (decedent and only child of the settlors), appealed probate-court rulings concerning interpretation of trust provisions (Article VIII, ¶¶ C & D).
On December 19, 2016 the probate court granted partial summary judgment for third-party defendants (distant relatives) and severed that judgment for appeal over Cortez’s objection.
On February 10, 2017 the probate court amended its severed judgment to include sanctions against Cortez’s attorneys (William Brotherton and Brotherton Law Firm), based largely on a related West Virginia ruling; Cortez later moved for new trial and filed amended notices of appeal that included the sanctions order.
Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to the sanctions order; Cortez filed a response arguing (1) the severance was improper and is a threshold jurisdictional issue, (2) he has standing because the sanctions have direct, ongoing prejudicial effects on the estate and his litigation in West Virginia, and (3) any defect in the notice of appeal is curable under Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(g).
Cortez also filed a motion for leave to amend the notice of appeal to expressly add his attorneys as appellants to ensure review of the sanctions ruling; he contends amendment would cause no prejudice and is consistent with Texas precedent allowing curative amendments when a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction was made.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the probate court’s severance of the partial summary judgment was proper (affects interlocutory v. final status)	Severance was improper; therefore the partial summary judgment and dependent orders (including sanctions) are interlocutory and the appellate court’s jurisdiction is limited to the severance issue	Implicitly: severance created a final, appealable judgment as entered	Pending — appellant urges the court to resolve severance first because it limits jurisdiction over other orders
Whether Cortez has standing to appeal the sanctions order (attorney sanctions)	Cortez suffers direct, remediable harm: sanctions materially prejudiced the estate’s litigation posture, have been leveraged in West Virginia proceedings, and threaten further sanctions against him and his counsel	Appellees argue sanctions implicate only attorneys and prior appellate decisions limit jurisdiction over attorney-only sanctions appeals	Pending — appellant argues unique, ongoing prejudice distinguishes this case from prior authority
Whether the second amended notice of appeal is curable or must be dismissed for failing to name sanctioned attorneys as appellants	Rule 25.1(b) and (g) permit amendment when a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction was made; leave to add Brotherton should be granted because Cortez timely appealed and no prejudice will result	Appellees rely on precedent requiring separate notices by sanctioned attorneys in some circuits/lines of cases	Pending — appellant requests leave to amend; cites liberal policy favoring substance over procedural technicalities
Whether the appellate court should summarily dismiss the sanctions challenge for lack of jurisdiction	Summary dismissal is inappropriate because of the severance threshold, standing showing, and curable notice defects; appellees have been on notice and will not be prejudiced	Appellees ask for summary dismissal under the court’s prior jurisprudence restricting appeals of attorney-only sanctions	Pending — appellant asks denial of dismissal or that the motion be carried with the appeal for full briefing

Key Cases Cited

Walker v. Blue Water Garden Apartments, 776 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. 1989) (party that makes bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction may be allowed to amend perfecting documents)
Woods Exploration & Production Co. v. Arkla Equipment Co., 528 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1975) (same principle favoring cure of defective perfecting documents)
Grand Prairie Sch. Dist. v. Southern Parts, 813 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1991) (timely filed document in bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction must be amendable)
Sweed v. Nye, 323 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. 2010) (timely filed document, even if defective, invokes court of appeals’ jurisdiction)
Blankenship v. Robins, 878 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1994) (decisions should turn on substance rather than procedural technicality)
Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997) (appellate courts should avoid dismissing appeals for curable procedural defects)
Dalisa, Inc. v. Bradford, 81 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002) (discussing limits of appellate jurisdiction when severance is challenged)
St. Mina Auto Sales, Inc. v. Al-Muasher, 481 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015) (holding appellate court may exercise discretion to consider attorney’s appeal where client timely filed notice of appeal)
Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1991) (Texas Supreme Court declined to decide whether attorney must perfect separate appeal to seek review of sanctions)