CUMre-21-35
Me. Super. CtApr 15, 2022Background:
- Plaintiffs (multiple recreational users and commercial marine operators) sued upland owners and others seeking declaratory relief that Maine (not upland owners) holds intertidal land and that public use rights extend beyond fishing, fowling, and navigation.
- Defendants include: (a) individual upland owners who called law enforcement or advocated for rockweed conservation ("PLNS Defendants"), (b) legal-entity upland owners who post signs and restrict access (Judy's Moody LLC, OA 2012 Trust, Ocean 503 LLC), and (c) pro se Parents (Jeffrey & Margaret Parent).
- Under settled Maine law upland owners typically hold title to intertidal land subject to public easement for fishing, fowling, navigation; plaintiffs seek to expand the public-use scope and, in some counts, to challenge title and invoke federal doctrines.
- The court granted the PLNS Defendants' special motion to dismiss under Maine's Anti-SLAPP statute, dismissing all claims against them; a subsequent request for attorneys' fees under the Anti-SLAPP statute was denied.
- 12(b)(6) review: Counts II (equal footing), III (judicial legislation/separation of powers), and V (quiet-title/statute of limitations) were dismissed as to the legal-entity defendants and the Parents; Count IV (declaratory relief expanding public use rights) survived against Judy's Moody, OA 2012, Ocean 503, and the Parents.
- Motions for more definite statements by the legal-entity defendants were denied; their motion for reconsideration of Count IV was also denied.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to bring declaratory claims | Plaintiffs (recreational & commercial) have real, substantial interests affected by restricted access | Defendants challenged who has prudential standing | Court found most plaintiffs had standing (recreational users and marine-economy actors); three plaintiffs lacked standing and were dismissed |
| Whether PLNS activity was protected petitioning activity (Anti‑SLAPP step 1) | Plaintiffs said naming PLNS Defendants was about dominion, not petitioning | PLNS: reports to Marine Patrol and conservation advocacy are protected petitioning activity | Court held PLNS reports/advocacy were petitioning activity and met step 1 |
| Whether PLNS petitioning lacked reasonable factual/legal basis (Anti‑SLAPP step 2) | Plaintiffs argued deeds/advantaged titles made petitioning legally baseless | PLNS showed reasonable factual basis (deeds, Law Court guidance, MDMR advice); plaintiffs failed to make prima facie showing | Court held plaintiffs failed to show petitioning was devoid of reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law; dismissal warranted |
| Proof of actual injury (Anti‑SLAPP) | Plaintiffs alleged economic harms from restricted harvest and access | PLNS argued harms were speculative and insufficiently quantified for Anti‑SLAPP's actual-injury requirement | Court held plaintiffs did not plead reasonably certain monetary valuation or special damages; Anti‑SLAPP dismissal affirmed |
| Sufficiency of Counts II, III, V (12(b)(6)) — equal footing, judicial-legislation, quiet title | Plaintiffs sought federal equal-footing vesting of title, separation-of-powers remedy, and quiet-title relief for historic conveyances | Defendants: Law Court precedent (Bell line) bars equal-footing title theory; judicial clarification is within judicial function; quiet-title claims time-barred | Court dismissed Counts II, III, and V as legally insufficient (equal footing rejected; no separation-of-powers violation; quiet-title barred by statute of limitations) |
| Sufficiency of Count IV — expansion of public-use rights (12(b)(6)) | Plaintiffs: their access for recreation/research (and some commercial uses) is or may be protected under Law Court's flexible test | Defendants: Count IV is vague and factually insufficient | Court held Count IV states a legally cognizable claim under Maine's flexible intertidal jurisprudence and survives pleading-stage challenge |
| Motion for more definite statement (Rule 12(e)) | Plaintiffs argued defendants waived or already had adequate notice | Defendants sought details about intended uses and specific incidents | Court: under Maine's liberal notice pleading Rule 8(a), Count IV gave fair notice; 12(e) motions denied |
| Anti‑SLAPP attorneys' fees request | PLNS sought fees and costs after prevailing on special motion | Plaintiffs argued suit had arguable merits and policy basis | Court exercised discretion not to award fees, finding plaintiffs' suit not filed with malintent the Anti‑SLAPP statute targets |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (Law Court rejected equal‑footing theory as vesting title to Maine intertidal lands in the State)
- Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986) (recognized colonial ordinance as part of state common law governing intertidal rights)
- Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 206 A.3d 283 (Me. 2019) (holding removal/harvest of marine plants from private intertidal land is not a permissible public use)
- McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620 (Me. 2011) (Law Court's flexible approach to defining permissible public uses in the intertidal zone)
- Thurlow v. Nelson, 263 A.3d 494 (Me. 2021) (framework for evaluating Anti‑SLAPP special motions)
- Nader v. Maine Democratic Party, 66 A.3d 571 (Me. 2013) (Anti‑SLAPP evidentiary framework and review of affidavits)
- Mancini v. Scott, 744 A.2d 1057 (Me. 2000) (factors for assessing attorney's fees)
- Seacoast Hangar Condo. II Ass'n v. Martel, 775 A.2d 1166 (Me. 2001) (standard for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Lalonde v. Central Maine Medical Ctr., 155 A.3d 426 (Me. 2017) (pleading standard: view allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff)