435 P.3d 1007
Alaska Ct. App.2018Background
- Massey was arrested and placed in a halfway house; after absconding he was later charged with second-degree escape and appointed the Public Defender.
- Massey repeatedly sought substitute counsel and, after denials, asked at an August 4, 2014 pretrial hearing to "go pro se." Judge Wolverton said he would conduct the self-representation inquiry at the next pretrial conference.
- The promised inquiry was not held at the rescheduled pretrial conference (August 27); Massey attempted to interject but was not permitted to speak.
- At the trial call before a different judge (Sept. 2), Judge Volland relied on notations on a sealed envelope and mistakenly concluded that Judge Wolverton had already denied Massey’s request to proceed pro se; he refused to reopen the issue.
- Massey protested personally but was ignored; his counsel did not press the matter. Massey was tried (bench trial) represented by counsel and convicted of second-degree escape.
- The Court of Appeals found Massey had clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation, but the court never conducted the required Faretta-type inquiry; the failure was a structural error requiring reversal.
Issues
| Issue | Massey’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Massey unequivocally invoked the right to self-representation | Massey argued he repeatedly and unambiguously requested to proceed pro se after substitute counsel was denied | State argued requests were not clear/equivocal because they were interwoven with requests for new counsel and were tentative | Court held Massey’s requests were clear and unequivocal and entitled him to a self-representation inquiry |
| Whether the court was required to conduct a Faretta inquiry | Massey argued the court was required to verify that waiver of counsel would be knowing, intelligent, and that he was capable of self-representation | State argued the record did not trigger the inquiry because requests were equivocal | Court held a Faretta inquiry was required and was not performed |
| Whether the failure to hold the inquiry was harmless error | Massey argued the error was structural and not subject to harmless-error review | State implied any error was not prejudicial | Court held the denial was a structural error requiring automatic reversal |
| Whether trial judges erred by refusing to let Massey personally speak to the court about the request | Massey argued being prevented from addressing the court prevented vindication of his Faretta right | State did not contest procedural complaints | Court relied on Massey’s inability to personally assert the right as part of the record showing denial of the Faretta process |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (recognizing Sixth Amendment right to self-representation)
- McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974) (Alaska constitution protects self-representation right)
- Johnson v. State, 188 P.3d 700 (Alaska App. 2008) (distinguishing equivocal and unequivocal Faretta requests)
- James v. State, 730 P.2d 811 (Alaska App. 1986) (requirements for knowing, intelligent waiver and competency to proceed pro se)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (denial of the right of self-representation is structural error; not subject to harmless-error review)