Massey-Diez v. University of Iowa Community Medical Services, Inc., 826 F.3d 1149

Background

Massey-Diez was a physician assistant employed under a year-to-year contract by UICMS; UICMS adopted EPIC charting software and set nonbinding "Standards of Excellence" (48-hour transcription review; generally complete within 7 days) and a formal Completion of Documentation Policy with progressive discipline for noncompliance.
She repeatedly fell behind on charting from 2012 into 2013, received Level 1/Level 2 discipline, and was placed on a 90-day probationary expectation (agreed March 21, 2013) to keep notes current (48-hour target) or risk nonrenewal of her contract.
On June 17, 2013 she took FMLA leave for a broken foot (leave intermittent through July 8). At the time she was noncompliant with the 48-hour expectation but compliant with the Completion Policy.
While on leave UICMS personnel contacted her to ask status/intent to return and requested she attend to EPIC inbox tasks (refills, triage, messages). Massey-Diez performed some inbox work and attempted to return part-time; she never told UICMS she refused those requests.
On or about July 2, 2013 supervisors decided not to renew her contract; she was notified July 9. The stated reason was repeated tardy charting and resulting loss of supervising physician’s confidence.
Massey-Diez sued under the FMLA for interference, discrimination (failure to renew for taking leave), and unpaid wages; the district court granted summary judgment for UICMS on all claims and the Eighth Circuit affirmed as to interference and discrimination.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did UICMS interfere with FMLA rights by contacting and directing work while on leave?	Massey-Diez contends repeated contacts and directives effectively coerced her to work while on FMLA, interfering with her leave.	UICMS says contacts were permissible status/return inquiries and any work performed was voluntary, not coerced or a condition of employment.	No interference: contacts and requests were allowed; evidence shows Massey-Diez voluntarily performed work, not coerced.
Was the nonrenewal discriminatory/retaliatory for taking FMLA leave?	Massey-Diez argues UICMS counted leave time in assessing late charting and timed the nonrenewal in retaliation for taking leave.	UICMS says nonrenewal was for chronic tardy charting and loss of supervising physician’s confidence, predating leave and based on probationary terms.	No discrimination: plaintiff failed to show direct evidence or pretext; tardy charting during the probation supported nonrenewal.
Was there direct evidence linking decisionmaker bias to FMLA leave?	Sequence of communications and statements (e.g., comment that she "should have worked" on leave) evidences bias.	UICMS says remarks were not direct imputations of discriminatory motive, and decisionmakers discussed general charting concerns, not leave.	No direct evidence: statements/circumstances were insufficiently probative of discriminatory intent.
Did plaintiff show pretext under McDonnell Douglas?	Massey-Diez points to compliance with Completion Policy at leave start, prior good reviews, and timing to show employer explanation is unworthy of credence.	UICMS points to the March 21 probation (48-hour expectation), repeated failures during that period, and supervisors’ longstanding concerns about charting.	No pretext: undisputed probation terms and ongoing noncompliance undermine inference of retaliation; comparator not similarly situated.

Key Cases Cited

Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 818 F.3d 356 (8th Cir.) (summary judgment standard)
Gazal v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 647 F.3d 833 (8th Cir.) (genuine issue/material fact definition)
Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir.) (elements of FMLA interference claim)
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (Sup. Ct.) (prejudice requirement and weight of DOL regs)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Sup. Ct.) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Bacon v. Hennepin County Med. Ctr., 550 F.3d 711 (8th Cir.) (reliance on FMLA regulations to affirm summary judgment)