Massasoit Industrial Corp. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
AC 16-P-459
| Mass. App. Ct. | Mar 23, 2017Background
- William J. Glynn, hired in 1986 as a part‑time outside maintenance/custodian, had an otherwise spotless record and had worked for Massasoit at the RMV for ~10 years.
- In late March–early April 2007 Glynn was hospitalized first for pneumonia and then for a heart attack; family members informed a coworker who promised to notify supervisors.
- Massasoit assigned coverage for Glynn from April 5–June 1, 2007; Glynn presented a doctor’s note clearing him to return on May 7, 2007 but was told he had been fired as a “no call/no show” and replaced.
- At termination Glynn was 74 (oldest in his department); his replacement was 68.
- Glynn filed an MCAD complaint alleging age and handicap discrimination; a hearing officer found Massasoit terminated him because of a combination of age and health concerns, awarded lost wages and $35,000 for emotional distress; the full MCAD affirmed and awarded attorney’s fees.
- Massasoit sought judicial review in Superior Court; the court affirmed the MCAD decision and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Glynn) | Defendant's Argument (Massasoit) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age discrimination / prima facie case | Glynn was in protected class, performed adequately, was terminated and replaced by a younger worker | Massasoit relied on no call/no show legitimate reason | Court: Glynn proved prima facie; hearing officer reasonably found employer’s no call/no show reason was pretext and terminated due to age concerns |
| Handicap discrimination — whether Glynn was "handicapped" | Glynn argued he had a record of impairment and was regarded as having an impairment (pneumonia/heart attack) | Massasoit argued Glynn failed to show a disability substantially limiting a major life activity | Court: Hearing officer properly found prima facie under record/‘‘regarded as’’ theory; employer perceived impairment and acted on it; discrimination upheld |
| Use of temporary illness / duration of impairment | Glynn relied on hospitalizations and clearance to return; duration irrelevant to "regarded as" theory | Massasoit argued temporary conditions are not protected | Court: Did not need to decide permanence; prior precedent and MCAD guidelines allow protection where employer regards employee as impaired; decision stands even under pre‑ADAAA law |
| Emotional distress damages | Glynn claimed anxiety, loss of self‑esteem and ongoing distress tied to wrongful termination | Massasoit contested sufficiency/notice of emotional distress claim | Court: Hearing officer’s credibility findings supported emotional distress award; complaint gave adequate notice; award proportionate and affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672 (establishes prima facie framework and burden shifting in discrimination cases)
- Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493 (pretext analysis and employer motive in termination cases)
- Dartt v. Browning‑Ferris Indus., Inc., 427 Mass. 1 (elements for handicap discrimination prima facie case)
- Dahill v. Police Dept. of Boston, 434 Mass. 233 (interpretation of "regarded as" handicapped under c.151B)
- New Bedford v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 440 Mass. 450 (definition and scope of disability in employment context)
- Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549 (standards for emotional distress damages under c.151B)