Massachusetts v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 462 F.Supp.3d 31

Background:

Massachusetts AG issued a Civil Investigative Demand in 2016 and filed a 205‑page complaint (Oct. 24, 2019) in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging ExxonMobil knew of climate risks for decades and engaged in a long‑running campaign of investor and consumer deception (greenwashing) in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (four counts: two investor, two consumer).
Relief sought: declaratory and injunctive relief, statutory penalties ($5,000 per violation), costs and attorneys’ fees; the suit targets marketing and disclosure practices, not seeking recovery for climate‑change damages.
ExxonMobil removed the case to federal court (Nov. 29, 2019); Massachusetts moved to remand (Dec. 26, 2019).
ExxonMobil asserted federal jurisdiction via (1) complete preemption/federal common law; (2) embedded federal question (Grable); (3) federal officer removal (28 U.S.C. § 1442); and (4) CAFA/class‑action removal.
The district court (Young, D.J.) held May 28, 2020 that federal jurisdiction was lacking and remanded to state court because none of ExxonMobil’s asserted exceptions to the well‑pleaded complaint rule applied.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Massachusetts)	Defendant's Argument (ExxonMobil)	Held
Whether state claims are completely preempted by federal law/federal common law	Claims are ordinary state fraud/consumer protection matters and do not implicate uniquely federal interests	Federal common law on interstate/ambient air and climate change wholly preempts state law (Judge Alsup theory)	Not preempted: Commonwealth’s fraud claims do not raise uniquely federal interests or require federal common law; complete preemption fails
Whether an embedded federal question (Grable) gives federal jurisdiction	No embedded federal issue; case concerns state law fraud and disclosures	Resolution would implicate foreign relations and national energy policy, satisfying Grable	No: federal issues are not necessarily raised or substantial here; Grable does not apply
Whether federal officer removal (28 U.S.C. § 1442) applies	ExxonMobil’s marketing/sales are unrelated to acts taken under federal leases; no sufficient nexus	ExxonMobil acted under federal officers (federal leases) and has colorable federal defenses; §1442(a)(1) (with "relating to") permits removal	No: even under the broadened "relating to" standard, alleged misrepresentation and marketing conduct are not plausibly related to federal‑lease activities and removal denied
Whether CAFA permits removal (state AG action as a "class action")	Chapter 93A §4 authorizes AG to sue in the public interest but is not similar to Rule 23; action is parens patriae/sovereign enforcement	The AG suit functions like a class action and thus is removable under CAFA	No: §93A §4 lacks Rule 23 hallmarks (numerosity, typicality, certification, notice) and chiefly advances sovereign remedies; not a CAFA class action

Key Cases Cited

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1987) (well‑pleaded complaint rule controls federal‑question removal)
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (U.S. 2005) (embedded federal‑issue jurisdiction doctrine)
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (U.S. 2013) (articulating Grable’s four‑part test)
American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2011) (scope of federal common law for interstate pollution/greenhouse gases)
Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2003) (complete preemption as exception to well‑pleaded complaint rule)
Watson v. Philip Morris Co., 551 U.S. 142 (U.S. 2007) (federal officer removal principles)
Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (U.S. 2002) (removal statutes construed strictly)
Fayard v. Northeast Vehicle Servs., LLC, 533 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (definition and limits of complete preemption)
López–Muñoz v. Triple–S Salud, Inc., 754 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (complete preemption framework)
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (U.S. 2014) (no presumption against removal under CAFA)