Mason v. Paramo, 3:16-cv-01176

Background

Petitioner Michael Baraka Mason, a documented Lincoln Park gang member, was convicted by a jury of multiple crimes including three counts of first‑degree murder and related enhancements; sentenced to consecutive life terms plus additional years. On direct appeal the state court affirmed most convictions and modified firearm convictions.
The key contested trial evidence was the preliminary hearing testimony of Hana Jabbar (an eyewitness who identified Mason), admitted at trial as prior testimony on the ground Jabbar was unavailable. The prosecution’s investigator testified he had searched for Jabbar (calls, texts, contacts, drove the East Village area, showed her photo to homeless persons) but could not locate her.
DNA evidence linked Mason to the Velma Terrace scene (a cigarette butt in the bathroom); DNA on a recovered gun was consistent with Mason as a likely contributor; other evidence included informant statements implicating Mason, identifications posted on Crime Stoppers/America’s Most Wanted, and connections to a van used in shootings.
Petitioner raised two federal habeas claims: (1) admission of Jabbar’s prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because the prosecution failed to exercise reasonable diligence to procure her attendance; (2) ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to act after a juror expressed doubt post‑verdict (the court dismissed claim two). The magistrate judge recommended denying claim one on the merits and as harmless.
The Court of Appeal found the prosecution exercised reasonable diligence under California Evidence Code §240(a)(5) and admitted the prior testimony; the federal habeas court applied AEDPA deference and concluded the state decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, and any error was not prejudicial given the other strong evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether admitting Hana Jabbar’s preliminary hearing testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because she was not shown to be "unavailable" (prosecution lacked reasonable diligence).	Mason: prosecutor made limited efforts and omitted reasonable measures (e.g., phone triangulation, contacting shelters, material witness warrant), so Jabbar was not unavailable and her prior testimony violated Crawford.	Respondent: investigator made timely, diligent, good‑faith efforts (calls, texts, interviews, searches in East Village); prosecution not required to exhaust all possible steps; state court reasonably found unavailability.	Court: Denied—state court reasonably concluded prosecution used due diligence; admission did not violate clearly established Supreme Court law.
If admission was error, whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Brecht prejudice standard).	Mason: Jabbar was the only eyewitness to identify Mason; her testimony was heavily relied on in closing; its admission had substantial injurious effect.	Respondent: ample independent evidence (DNA on cigarette, DNA on gun, informant statements, public identifications, van forensic links) made any error harmless.	Court: Denied—any error was harmless under Brecht given strong corroborating evidence; no grave doubt about outcome.

Key Cases Cited

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir.) (federal courts give deference to state court factual findings)
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (Sup. Ct.) (AEDPA governs federal habeas review)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (Sup. Ct.) (standard for "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" under AEDPA)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Sup. Ct.) (Confrontation Clause requires unavailability and prior opportunity for cross‑examination for testimonial evidence)
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (Sup. Ct.) (witness is "unavailable" only after good‑faith prosecutorial efforts to obtain attendance)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (Sup. Ct.) (harmless error standard for federal habeas: "substantial and injurious effect")
Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65 (Sup. Ct.) (state court’s unavailability finding not overturned simply because additional steps might have been taken)
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (Sup. Ct.) (federal courts "look through" unexplained state supreme court denials to the last reasoned decision)