Maschek v. City of Chicago
46 N.E.3d 843
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- On June 26, 2014 Maschek received and paid an automated speed enforcement (ASE) ticket near Lane Tech High School for driving 41 mph in a 30-mph zone; he did not contest he was speeding.
- Maschek sued the City seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (and other counts), claiming the ASE camera operated unlawfully because ASE cameras may be used only on “school days” and Maschek argued that summer/special-program days were not “school days.”
- The City moved to dismiss under 735 ILCS 5/2-619, submitting an affidavit that summer classes (extended school year special education and virtual credit-recovery) met on June 26, 2014 and that about 71 students attended.
- The trial court granted the City’s 2-619 motion, found June 26 was a “school day,” denied leave to amend to add a facial vagueness challenge, and Maschek appealed.
- The appellate court reviewed de novo, examined the statutory language, legislative history, and related codes, and focused on whether special education/credit-recovery sessions qualify as a “school day” under 625 ILCS 5/11-208.8.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether June 26, 2014 was a “school day” for ASE purposes | "School days" excludes summer/special-program days; June 26 was outside regular academic year | "School day" includes any day classes are held; special-needs ESY and credit-recovery were classes that day | Held: "school day" includes days children attend for instructional purposes; June 26 was a school day |
| Whether special education extended school year (ESY) qualifies as a “school day” | ESY should not count as regular "school day" for ASE enforcement | Federal and state special-education regulations define "school day" as any day children attend for instruction, including children with disabilities | Held: ESY counts as a school day under 34 C.F.R. §300.11 and 23 Ill. Adm. Code 226.75 adopted by Illinois; therefore ASE use was authorized |
| Whether virtual/credit-recovery classes qualify as a “school day” | Summer recovery classes fall outside "school day" definition | Such programs are authorized by School Code and conducted as instructional days | Held: Court did not need to decide because ESY attendance was sufficient to make the day a school day |
| Whether plaintiff could amend to add a facial vagueness challenge | Maschek sought to add a claim that ASE statute is unconstitutionally vague as to when cameras operate | City argued Maschek lacks standing and his conduct fell squarely within the speed limit violation irrespective of enforcement method | Held: Denied leave to amend; Maschek lacked standing for a facial vagueness claim because the operative speed law was clear and he was not injured by any alleged vagueness |
Key Cases Cited
- DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49 (affirming that a section 2-619 motion admits legal sufficiency but raises affirmative matters)
- Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558 (de novo review applies to 2-619 dismissals raising legal issues)
- Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392 (plain statutory language controls; legislative history consulted only if ambiguous)
- Cardamone v. Department of Revenue, 232 Ill. 2d 504 (statute must be read in its entirety to ascertain legislative intent)
- Office of the Cook County State’s Attorney v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 166 Ill. 2d 296 (exceptions to exhaustion of administrative remedies for pure questions of law or statutory authority)