Maryland State Police v. McLean
14 A.3d 658
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2011Background
- MSP denied renewal of McLean's handgun carry permit (renewal 2006) based on his 1983 breaking and entering conviction, alleging a disqualifying misdemeanor because the crime carried more than a two-year penalty at renewal time.
- The 1983 conviction was under Art. 27, § 31B (breaking and entering storehouse), with a maximum sentence of six months, plus probation.
- In 1994, the legislature recodified the offense as burglary in the fourth degree, increasing the maximum penalty to three years.
- In 1996, PS § 5-101(g)(3) added to the disqualifying crimes any misdemeanor carrying a statutory penalty of more than two years, aligning Maryland law with federal standards.
- The Handgun Review Board reversed MSP, and the circuit court affirmed; MSP then sought appellate review challenging how the disqualifying-crime penalty should be assessed.
- The issue before the Court is whether, for PS § 5-101(g)(3), the penalty to be considered is the present (current) Maryland penalty for the equivalent offense at the time of applying for renewal, rather than the penalty at the time of the 1983 conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| How to interpret PS 5-101(g)(3) for disqualifying crimes. | McLean argues the penalty should be the conviction-time penalty (older statute). | MSP argues the penalty should be the current Maryland penalty for the equivalent offense at application. | Unambiguous; use current Maryland penalty for the equivalent offense at application. |
| Whether the 1983 offense should be treated as a disqualifying crime under the 1996 amendments. | McLean contends the 1983 offense was not the fourth-degree burglary and thus penalties don’t apply. | MSP contends the 1994–1996 changes make storehouse breaking a disqualifying crime. | The 1996 amendments apply, making the offense a disqualifying crime based on the current Maryland penalties. |
| Is the Board's interpretation of the statute correct given legislative history and policy? | McLean argues the Board's reading ignores the grandfathering or intent to protect pre-existing permit holders. | MSP argues the law reflects a broad, uniform disqualification rule. | Statutory language controls; legislative history supports current-penalty interpretation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Handgun Permit Review Board, 188 Md.App. 455, 982 A.2d 830 (Md. Ct. App. 2009) (ambiguity in out-of-state penalties resolved by Maryland-equivalent standard)
- McKenzie v. State, 407 Md. 120, 962 A.2d 998 (Md. 2008) (statutory burglary fourth degree origins and elements)
- Comptroller v. Brown, 390 Md. 528, 890 A.2d 279 (Md. 2006) (recodification presumed clarifying, not changing meaning)
- Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479, 10 A.3d 1167 (Md. 2011) (gun ownership is not an unconditional right; regulation permissible)
- Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 880 A.2d 343 (Md. 2005) (statutory interpretation framework; legislative intent from language first)
- Pappas v. Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 413 A.2d 549 (Md. 1980) (caution against inserting omitted language to create intent)
- Falik v. Prince George's Hosp., 322 Md. 409, 588 A.2d 324 (Md. 1991) (maxims on statutory interpretation and avoiding casus omissus)
- Brown v. United States (District of Columbia v. Heller), 554 U.S. 570 (U.S. 2008) (federal framework for firearm regulation referenced)