Mary Williams v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child
2022 Ark. App. 162
Ark. Ct. App.2022Background
- BW (b. Dec. 10, 2019) was removed from Mary Williams’s custody Feb. 27, 2020 after Mary tested positive for methamphetamine/amphetamines and was incarcerated for parole violations; BW was left at the parole office and an ex parte emergency custody order issued.
- DHS obtained an agreed adjudication finding BW dependent-neglected due to Mary’s drug use and incarceration; the initial goal was reunification but services and treatment were ordered.
- Mary completed a 28‑day inpatient program but did not engage in recommended outpatient treatment, continued to use drugs, and was arrested Dec. 5, 2020; she pled guilty and received concurrent 36‑month prison sentences with 36 months SIS.
- By the July 14, 2021 termination hearing, BW was 19 months old and had spent almost his entire life in foster care; the foster family expressed interest in adoption.
- DHS petitioned to terminate Mary’s parental rights on multiple statutory grounds; the circuit court found statutory grounds (including criminal sentence constituting a substantial period of the child’s life) and that termination was in BW’s best interest, and it terminated Mary’s rights.
- Mary appealed; counsel filed a Linker‑Flores no‑merit brief and moved to withdraw; the Court of Appeals affirmed and granted withdrawal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mary) | Defendant's Argument (DHS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mary’s criminal sentence constitutes a statutory ground for termination (substantial portion of child’s life) | Mary asserted she might be released by end of 2021, implying the sentence would not be a substantial portion | DHS argued the actual sentence length (36 months concurrent) supports the statutory ground irrespective of speculative release dates | Court held the sentence constituted a substantial portion of BW’s life and satisfied Ark. Code § 9‑27‑341(b)(3)(B)(viii) — supports termination |
| Adoptability of the child (best‑interest factor) | Mary argued termination was not in BW’s best interest because she had a post‑release plan | DHS relied on caseworker testimony that BW was healthy, adoptable, and foster parents wanted to adopt | Court accepted uncontroverted caseworker testimony that BW was adoptable; adoptability supports termination |
| Potential harm if child returned (best‑interest potential‑harm prong) | Mary contended she could safely parent BW upon release and sought more time | DHS pointed to Mary’s unresolved substance‑use history, relapse while on parole, continuing incarceration, and lack of stability/support | Court held forward‑looking potential‑harm evidence supported that returning BW to Mary posed significant risk; best‑interest harm prong satisfied |
| Admission of Mary’s sentencing orders over Rule 404(b) objection | Mary (through counsel) argued the orders were improper character evidence under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) | DHS offered the orders as proof of statutory grounds and relevant to fitness/length of incarceration | Court overruled objection, admitted the sentencing orders as relevant to termination grounds; admission was not reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Linker‑Flores v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 194 S.W.3d 739 (explaining appellate/no‑merit procedure for appointed counsel in termination appeals)
- Houseman v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 491 S.W.3d 153 (describing two‑step termination analysis: statutory ground and best interest)
- Dunbar v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 503 S.W.3d 821 (explaining standard of review in termination appeals)
- Sanford v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 474 S.W.3d 503 (recognizing long incarceration can be a substantial portion of a young child’s life)
- Hill v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 389 S.W.3d 72 (same—incarceration may satisfy statutory ground re substantial period)
- Dowdy v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 314 S.W.3d 722 (potential‑harm prong must be assessed forward‑looking and broadly)
- Leonard v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 377 S.W.3d 511 (child’s need for permanency can outweigh parent’s request for more time)
- Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 523 S.W.3d 920 (the “wait‑and‑see” approach may be contrary to child's best interest)