Mary Richards v. U.S. Steel, 869 F.3d 557

Richards, employed by National Steel then U.S. Steel after 2003, alleged a hostile work environment and related actions by supervisors in the Furnace Department (2010–2011).
She experienced multiple alleged misconduct incidents by supervisor Byrd (e.g., June 2010 jacket incident; December 2010 break-room incident) that allegedly threatened or demeaned her, plus related conduct by other personnel.
She reported Byrd’s conduct to HR and a hotline in early 2011; HR personnel provided a response that Richards found insensitive.
She resigned from the Furnace Department in January 2011, then transferred to Maintenance Services; Byrd followed and spoke with her, which she avoided.
Richards later filed a discrimination complaint (January 2011) and an IIED claim; the district court granted summary judgment to U.S. Steel on preemption grounds under the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/8-111(D)).
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding the IIED claim could not be maintained independently of the Act and that, on the limited set of conduct attributable to U.S. Steel, the actions were not extreme and outrageous under Illinois law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Preemption of the IIED claim under the Illinois Human Rights Act	Richards argues Act preemption bars only certain claims, not an independent IIED claim.	U.S. Steel contends the IIED claim is preempted since it arises from civil rights violations under the Act.	Preemption allowed only if the tort claim cannot be stated independently of the Act.
Respondeat superior and scope of employment	Richards argues employer should be vicariously liable for supervisor misconduct.	U.S. Steel contends some misconduct is outside the scope of employment and not attributable.	Not all supervisor conduct is within the employer’s vicarious liability; some acts cannot be attributed.
Extreme and outrageous standard for IIED in workplace context	Richards asserts the conduct was extreme and outrageous.	U.S. Steel argues the acts are not beyond the bounds of civilized society for IIED.	The alleged conduct did not reach the extreme and outrageous threshold under Illinois law.

Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1997) (preemption test focuses on independent elements of tort claims, not overlap with the Act)
Geise v. Phoenix Co., 639 N.E.2d 1273 (Ill. 1994) (no independent basis for IIED when Act creates exclusive duties")
Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2006) (tort not preempted if plaintiff can plead elements of tort independent of the Act)