Mary Price v. Indiana Department of Child Services Director of Indiana Department of Child Services
2017 Ind. LEXIS 629
| Ind. | 2017Background
- Mary Price, a family case manager at Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS), alleged her ongoing-services caseload reached 43 children, exceeding the statutory cap of 17 per case manager under I.C. § 31-25-2-5.
- The statute requires DCS to ensure regional staffing so caseloads do not exceed specified ratios and to submit annual caseload data; other related provisions impose discrete reporting and administrative duties.
- Price filed a proposed class action seeking a judicial mandate ordering DCS and its director to take all necessary steps to comply with the 17-child cap.
- DCS moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim; the trial court dismissed under Rule 12(B)(6).
- The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed as to mandate; the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and considered only Price’s individual claim (class not certified).
- The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, holding mandamus unavailable because § 31-25-2-5 prescribes an outcome (caseload caps) but does not require a specific, ministerial act that a court can command; it also agreed § 5 does not create a private right of action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over mandate action | Price asserted court could hear her mandamus claim | DCS argued jurisdictional and merits defenses in motion to dismiss | Court: Marion Superior Court (and this Court on appeal) had jurisdiction; issue resolved on merits |
| Whether I.C. § 31-25-2-5 is enforceable by judicial mandate | Price: § 5’s mandatory language (“shall ensure”, “shall comply”) creates a clear duty to compel compliance with 17-child cap | DCS: § 5 prescribes an outcome, not a specific ministerial act; discretion remains in how to comply | Court: Mandamus requires a specific, ministerial act; § 5 sets an outcome and affords discretion, so mandamus not available |
| Whether § 31-25-2-5 creates a private right of action | Price: statute permits private enforcement of caseload limits | DCS: statute benefits the public generally and provides no individual private cause of action | Court: Agreed with DCS; no private right of action under § 5 |
| Whether Gushwa precedent supports broad mandamus to compel compliance | Price relied on Gushwa (trustee must build high school) to justify ordering DCS to take necessary steps | DCS: Gushwa is an outlier and inconsistent with modern mandate doctrine | Court: Gushwa is not controlling; it is inconsistent with longstanding requirement that mandamus compel a specific, non‑discretionary act |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Civil City of South Bend v. Court of Appeals of Indiana – Third Dist., 406 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1980) (mandamus is an extraordinary remedy viewed with disfavor)
- State ex rel. Mann v. Jaberg, 151 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. 1958) (mandamus lies only when a clear legal duty exists to "do and perform" the act demanded)
- Gushwa v. State ex rel. Oster, 189 N.E. 129 (Ind. 1934) (trustee required to establish high school once statutory conditions met — treated here as an outlier)
- Knutson v. State ex rel. Seberger, 157 N.E.2d 469 (Ind. 1959) (public officials may be mandated to perform ministerial acts)
- Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169 (Ind. 1861) (definition of ministerial act: done in prescribed manner without exercise of judgment)
- State ex rel. Winkler v. Superior Court of Marion County, Room No. 3, 229 N.E.2d 648 (Ind. 1967) (mandamus denied when statute did not impose a clear duty to act)