Mary Nabozny v. Optio Solutions LLC
84 F.4th 731
7th Cir.2023Background
- Optio Solutions (doing business as Qualia) sent Nabozny a form collection letter about a defaulted credit-card debt; the letter was printed and mailed by third-party vendor RevSpring.
- Nabozny did not consent to Optio’s sharing of her debt information with RevSpring and sued under FDCPA § 1692c(b), which bars debt collectors from communicating about a debt with anyone other than the consumer.
- The suit was brought as a putative class action on behalf of others who received similar letters.
- Optio moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing Nabozny lacked Article III standing because she suffered no concrete injury from the alleged disclosure.
- The district court dismissed for lack of standing; after briefing, the Seventh Circuit considered recent en banc and Tenth Circuit decisions (Hunstein and Shields) rejecting standing in materially identical cases.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that disclosure to a single printing/mail vendor (with no allegation of public dissemination) does not cause a concrete, Article III cognizable privacy injury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a debt collector’s disclosure of a consumer’s debt data to a third-party mail vendor (to populate/send a form letter) gives the consumer Article III standing under FDCPA § 1692c(b) | Nabozny: sharing debt data with a vendor invaded her privacy and deprived her of control over personal financial information—analogous to common-law privacy torts, so constitutes a concrete injury | Optio: transmission to a single ministerial vendor caused no public disclosure or other traditional, concrete harm and therefore no Article III injury | Court: No standing—disclosure to a single vendor without publicity is not analogous to the public-disclosure privacy tort and is not a concrete injury under Article III |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (injury-in-fact must be concrete and particularized; congressional violations require judicial assessment of concreteness)
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) (distinguishes disseminated vs. undisclosed harms; publication required for defamation-like injuries to be concrete)
- Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 48 F.4th 1236 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (holding that disclosure to a mail vendor did not cause a concrete privacy injury for Article III purposes)
- Shields v. Professional Bureau of Collections of Md., Inc., 55 F.4th 823 (10th Cir. 2022) (adopting Hunstein reasoning)
- Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020) (framework that requires a close relationship in kind to common-law harms)
- Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Sys., LLC, 980 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 2020) (recognizing distinctive, concrete harm from disclosure of immutable biometric identifiers)
- Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 20 F.4th 1156 (7th Cir. 2021) (standing analysis under privacy/biometric statutes)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (plaintiff bears burden to establish Article III standing)