Mary Matson v. United Parcel Service Inc.
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 19927
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Mary Matson, a UPS combination worker represented by Teamsters Local 174, alleged a gender-based hostile work environment (including systematic denial of "extra work" that increased pay), sexualized harassment, and related claims while employed 2002–2010.
- Her workplace complaints produced multiple union grievances and several grievance settlements in which UPS agreed to consider seniority and, in some instances, compensate Matson for lost work.
- UPS discharged Matson for "proven dishonesty" in 2010; the labor panel upheld the discharge and her grievance did not reach arbitration.
- Matson sued in state court raising state-law discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims; UPS removed to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment on some claims but allowed the gender-based hostile work environment claim to proceed to trial.
- A first jury found for Matson on the hostile-work-environment claim and awarded $500,000. The district court later granted UPS’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (or new trial), holding the hostile-work-environment claim was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA because resolving whether disputed assignments were "extra work" would require interpretation of the CBA. After a second trial resulted for UPS, Matson appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Matson’s state-law gender-based hostile work environment claim is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA | Matson argued her hostile work environment right is a state-law right independent of the CBA and can be resolved by examining workplace conduct and management response without interpreting the CBA | UPS argued resolution requires interpreting the CBA term "extra work" and whether Matson was contractually entitled to assignments, so the claim is preempted under § 301 | Reversed district court: claim not preempted. The hostile-work-environment claim is a state-law right and resolving it did not require interpreting the CBA in the § 301 sense |
| Whether evidence about assignment of "extra work" necessarily converts the claim into a § 301 contract claim | Matson contended assignment patterns are evidence of discrimination but do not depend on contractual entitlement to the work | UPS contended that proving discriminatory assignment requires establishing contractual entitlement (seniority) under the CBA | Held for Matson: discriminatory assignment can be evidence of a hostile work environment irrespective of contractual entitlement; any CBA interpretation was peripheral and not required |
| Whether grievance settlements that reference seniority/licensing of "extra work" create a need to interpret the CBA | Matson noted grievance settlements already addressed assignment practices and established that seniority was considered, so no fresh interpretation was needed | UPS argued unsettled CBA language makes interpretation necessary | Held: settlements either construed the CBA or were independent labor-management agreements; they eliminate need for interpretive inquiry in court |
| Whether Perugini (IIED preemption) controls here | Matson distinguished Perugini because it did not involve sex-discrimination/hostile-work-environment law and focused on managerial discretion | UPS relied on Perugini to show contract interpretation was necessary to judge employer conduct | Held: Perugini is distinguishable; even managerial discretion exercised discriminatorily is actionable under state anti-discrimination law without § 301 preemption |
Key Cases Cited
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (preemption of state-law claims grounded in CBAs; federal common law for labor contracts)
- Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (federal jurisdiction to fashion law for labor contract disputes)
- Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.) (recent discussion of § 301 preemption and limits on scuttling state-law claims)
- Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.) (two-step test for § 301 preemption inquiry)
- Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir.) (preemption not mandated merely because defendant cites CBA in defense)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (state-law rights independent of CBAs are not preempted)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (state-law claims founded on CBA rights are preempted)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (state-law claims that require CBA construction are preempted)
- Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.) (narrow definition of "interpret" under § 301)
- Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.) (IIED preemption where managerial acts must be judged against CBA constraints)