150 N.E.3d 616
Ind. Ct. App.2020Background
- William Moriarty, an elderly man with congestive heart failure and diagnosed anxiety/depression after his wife Doreen’s 2016 death, married Eve in October 2016 about seven months later.
- After the marriage William made several atypical transfers/purchases: purchased a Glen Ridge house (deeded to husband-and-wife), surrendered a life-insurance policy whose proceeds became jointly held, and bought a Lexus shortly before his death.
- On April 6, 2017 William executed a will (the Purported Will) leaving virtually his entire estate to Eve and naming her personal representative; he also executed durable and health care powers of attorney in Eve’s favor.
- Daughters (Cathy and Paula) expected to inherit equally based on prior statements by William; they filed suit contesting the Purported Will for lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence and asserting tortious interference with inheritance as to nonprobate transfers.
- At trial the court permitted Daughters to reopen their case to call Eve as a witness over her objection; the court found by clear and convincing evidence that William was susceptible to undue influence, that Eve exercised undue influence, invalidated the Purported Will, ordered intestate distribution, and awarded remedies including transfer of the house and car and a constructive-trust money judgment for joint-account proceeds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Daughters) | Defendant's Argument (Eve) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused discretion by allowing Daughters to reopen their case and call Eve as a witness | Reopening was proper; trial court should permit presentation of the whole case and Daughters should be allowed to examine Eve. | Reopening prejudiced Eve because Daughters rested intentionally and benefited from hearing Eve’s defense; reopening after both sides rested was improper. | No abuse of discretion; court permissibly reopened, offered cross-exam and opportunity to call witnesses, Eve declined further use of those opportunities. |
| Whether the Purported Will is invalid for undue influence | Evidence (isolation, medical vulnerability, financial shifts, Eve’s involvement in procuring will and transfers) shows undue influence produced the Will. | Contests the sufficiency of circumstantial proof and some factual findings (e.g., demeanor); argues trial court erred legally and factually. | Affirmed: substantial circumstantial evidence supported finding Eve exercised undue influence; Will invalidated. |
| Whether the Purported Will is invalid for lack of testamentary capacity | William lacked capacity to judge the deserts of his natural objects (his daughters) given illness, depression, and dependency. | Argues William had capacity; challenges factual findings and that court improperly applied standards. | Court concluded lack of capacity as alternative ground; appellate opinion affirms on undue influence ground and does not need to resolve capacity arguments further. |
| Whether Daughters proved tortious interference with inheritance and standard for joint accounts | Tortious interference proven where undue influence produced inter vivos transfers and joint-account conversions; joint-account proceeds must be shown by clear and convincing evidence to reflect contrary intent. | Argues trial court misapplied legal standard and evidence insufficient to show William did not intend Eve to receive transfers/proceeds. | Affirmed: court applied clear-and-convincing standard to joint accounts and found Daughters met it; judgment for tortious interference stands. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hays v. Harmon, 809 N.E.2d 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (presumption of testamentary capacity and elements to prove lack of capacity)
- Gast v. Hall, 858 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (admissibility of prior mental-condition evidence to show capacity at execution)
- Womack v. Womack, 622 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1993) (clear-and-convincing standard to rebut presumption that joint-account survivor takes proceeds)
- Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (tortious-interference-with-inheritance framework adopting Restatement § 774B)
- In re Rhoades, 993 N.E.2d 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (use of circumstantial evidence and factors to infer undue influence)
- In re Estate of Compton, 919 N.E.2d 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (definition and standards for undue influence)
- Flynn v. State, 497 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. 1986) (factors courts consider in deciding whether to permit reopening of evidence)
- Trabucco v. Trabucco, 944 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (standard of review for findings and conclusions under Trial Rule 52(A))