Mary DiFederico v. Marriott International, Inc.
677 F. App'x 830
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- Guest Albert DiFederico was killed in the September 20, 2008 terrorist bombing of the Marriott Islamabad; 56 people died and 265 were injured.
- The Islamabad was a franchised Marriott hotel owned/operated by Hashwani, Inc.; Marriott International was the franchisor but did not manage day-to-day operations.
- The truck bomb crashed into the hotel’s Delta gate barrier, then exploded; the hotel’s security staff treated the initial incident as an automobile fire and did not alert guests.
- Plaintiffs (DiFederico’s family) sued Marriott for wrongful death, alleging Marriott exercised sufficient control over the Islamabad’s security protocols (the instrumentality causing death); Hashwani was not named as a defendant.
- Marriott required franchisees to follow written Standards, sent non-mandatory Crisis/International Plans for guidance, and audited compliance with a limited yes/no checklist twice yearly, but did not hire, train, or approve the Islamabad’s security staff or review its local crisis plan.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Marriott, finding insufficient control; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, applying Pakistani substantive law (lex loci delicti) but noting material parity with Maryland law on franchisor liability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Marriott can be liable as franchisor for control of the instrumentality (security protocols) that caused death | Marriott exercised sufficient control over Islamabad’s security (standards, plans, audits, communications) to make it liable | Marriott only set minimum brand Standards, provided non-mandatory Plans, performed limited audits, and did not hire/train or direct local security; control remained with Hashwani | Marriott did not exercise sufficient control over the instrumentalities that caused the death; summary judgment for Marriott affirmed |
| Whether Marriott’s distribution of non-mandatory Plans and Standards created a duty to implement specific security measures | Distribution and Standards established effective control and required implementation | Plans are guidance for franchisees; mandatory requirements are limited to the Standards; Marriott did not require or approve the Islamabad’s local plan | Non-mandatory Plans and limited Standards/audits do not establish control or duty to operate local security procedures |
| Whether Marriott’s post-attack site review/email or public testimony creates a triable issue on pre-attack control | Post-attack communications and organizational statements (e.g., "our security measures") show Marriott had operational control before the attack | Post-attack materials and generalized statements do not show pre-attack operational control or authority over local security actions | Post-attack email/testimony did not create a genuine issue of fact about pre-attack control |
| Whether Marriott’s biannual audits created control over specific safety measures that caused the injury | Audits demonstrate Marriott monitored and controlled compliance, implying operational control | Audits were limited checklists verifying presence of a plan and basic items; Marriott did not review or approve the local plan or train staff | Limited compliance audits were insufficient to confer control over the instrumentalities that led to the death |
Key Cases Cited
- Allen v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 672 (D.S.C. 2006) (franchisor’s requiring minimum safety equipment and making recommendations does not establish liability for franchisee’s operational choices)
- Roe v. Doe, 28 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1994) (standard of review for summary judgment; draw inferences for the nonmoving party)
- DiFederico v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 796 (4th Cir. 2013) (prior interlocutory appellate ruling in the same litigation addressing forum non conveniens and choice-of-law principles)
- Stenlund v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 874 (D. Md. 2016) (limited franchisor audits and subsidiarity do not by themselves establish control over franchisee’s operational instrumentalities)
