Mary C. Fanelli v. HSBC Bank USA, 170 So. 3d 72

Mary Fanelli, defendant in a mortgage foreclosure, filed an amended answer in 2010 that included the statement: "Defendant has retained the undersigned to represent her and has agreed to pay the Law Offices of W. Trent Steele a reasonable fee for their services."
The amended answer did not include a separate prayer or explicit demand for attorney’s fees.
The trial court involuntarily dismissed the foreclosure without prejudice on the first day of trial.
Fanelli moved for attorney’s fees under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.525 and § 57.105(7), Fla. Stat.; the trial court denied the motion, finding the amended answer failed to adequately plead a claim for fees.
The Fourth District reversed, holding that the answer’s fee-language—substantively identical to the pre-2014 Form 1.944 complaint language—sufficiently put the opposing party on notice and supported a later motion for attorney’s fees.
The opinion notes that after December 11, 2014, new Form 1.944 requires specifying the basis for and demanding attorney’s fees in the wherefore clause, so future pleadings must follow the new form.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a statement in an answer that the defendant agreed to pay counsel a reasonable fee satisfies pleading requirement to preserve a later fee claim	Fanelli: the sentence about retaining counsel and agreeing to pay a fee gives adequate notice, like pre-2014 Form 1.944, so fee claim preserved	HSBC: the answer failed to plead a fee claim because there was no separate demand or prayer for attorney’s fees	The court held the answer’s statement was sufficient to preserve a fee claim because it provided notice comparable to pre-2014 Form 1.944
Whether Stockman and its progeny require more specificity than the answer provided	Fanelli: Stockman’s notice purpose is satisfied by the fee language; specificity beyond notice is not required	HSBC: Stockman requires an affirmative pleading of fees and the answer lacked an explicit claim	The court applied Stockman as a notice rule and concluded the answer met that requirement; reversed denial of fees

Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991) (failure to plead claim for attorney’s fees constitutes waiver unless notice is given)
Green v. Sun Harbor Homeowners’ Ass’n, 730 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 1999) (Stockman read to mean omission of fee claim in pleading is waiver)
Caufield v. Cantele, 837 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2002) (pleading specificity not required; contractual or statutory basis need not be specifically pled)
Dickson v. Heaton, 87 So. 3d 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (same: failure to specify statutory or contractual basis does not waive fee claim)
American Express Bank Int’l v. Inverpan, S.A., 972 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (reversed fee award where complaint lacked a demand for fees; distinguished by court on facts)
In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 153 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 2014) (adopting new mortgage-foreclosure forms requiring a stated basis for and a demand for attorneys’ fees)