Mary Burton v. Teleflex Inc
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3538
| 3rd Cir. | 2013Background
- Burton founded medical device companies later sold to Teleflex; she signed employment agreements with Teleflex including 30-day termination notice and severance terms.
- Burton, age 67 at the sale, became VP of New Business Development at SMD and supervised sales; Boarini, Teleflex SVP, supervised Burton and their relationship was strained.
- In 2008, Burton and Boarini discussed Burton's lack of communication and undefined performance objectives; their trade-show meeting led Burton to believe Boarini wanted to discuss performance, not termination.
- Boarini testified he did not inform Burton of any performance issues; Burton denied resigning and alleged Teleflex manufactured a resignation narrative after the meeting.
- Two Teleflex employees later claimed Burton told them she resigned; Teleflex relied on these statements to conclude she had resigned and sent a resignation-acceptance letter with severance offer conditioned on non-compete/quit terms.
- Burton never submitted a written resignation; Teleflex never confirmed she resigned; she remained on vacation and later received a formal letter accepting resignation, while her employment file stated she left to pursue other opportunities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Burton terminated or did she resign? | Burton did not resign; she denied resignation and Teleflex relied on hearsay to conclude termination. | Teleflex reasonably believed Burton resigned based on Boarini's assessment and third-party statements. | Vacate summary judgment; dispute of fact exists. |
| Did Burton establish a prima facie case of ADEA/Title VII discrimination? | Evidence and inference support discrimination; there was an adverse action and a pretextual justification. | Burton failed to show an adverse action or plausible pretext. | Vacate and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
| Was Teleflex's proffered reason for Burton's separation pretextual? | Discrepancies and credibility issues undermine the stated resignation justification. | The stated reason was legitimate and not shown to be pretextual. | Vacate pretext footing; remand for full consideration. |
| Does Burton's breach of contract claim depend on resignation vs termination? | If terminated, Teleflex breached the Employment Agreement by not providing severance. | If Burton resigned, severance may not apply. | Vacate; material fact exists as to resignation vs termination. |
| Are Burton's state-law claims (good faith, interference, defamation) viable? | Duties and harms arise from Teleflex actions surrounding separation. | Contractual covenant is subsumed; certain claims lack independent tort basis. | Affirm dismissal of good faith, interference, and defamation; otherwise vacate. |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court 1973) (establishes the three-step framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
- Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 2009) (applies McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA cases with indirect evidence)
- Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535 (3d Cir. 2006) (applies McDonnell Douglas to Title VII gender discrimination)
- Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (two-part pretext framework; evidence need not be direct to show pretext)
- Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2012) (pretext can be shown by credibility and likelihood of discriminatory motives)
- Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 2003) (pretext and discrimination analyses guidance in Title VII context)
- Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008) (burden-shifting framework for pretext showing at summary judgment)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (Supreme Court 2000) (pretext evidence can be highly persuasive in proving discrimination)
- Duffy v. Paper Magic Grp., 265 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasizes substantial evidence standard for prima facie case at summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court 1986) (summary judgment standard; court may rely on credible evidence and not weigh evidence)
