345 Mich. App. 254
Mich. Ct. App.2023Background
- Plaintiff (Armijo) received treatment in February–March 2018; claim accrued March 6, 2018.
- Armijo served the statutory 182‑day notice of intent under MCL 600.2912b on February 19, 2020; that notice tolled the two‑year statute of limitations under MCL 600.5856(c), leaving 16 days remaining once the notice period ended.
- Without any COVID orders, Armijo therefore had until September 4, 2020 to file her malpractice complaint.
- Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2020‑3 (Mar. 23, 2020), its Amended AO 2020‑3 (May 1, 2020), and AO 2020‑18 (rescission effective June 20, 2020) addressed computation of deadlines during the COVID state of emergency; the Amended AO expressly stated it did not “suspend or toll any time period that must elapse before the commencement of an action.”
- Armijo filed her complaint on December 14, 2020. Defendants moved for summary disposition as time‑barred; the trial court denied the motions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the AOs did not toll the notice period or the limitations deadline applicable here and directing summary disposition for defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether the Michigan Supreme Court had authority to modify statutes of limitations during the COVID emergency | Armijo: Supreme Court orders valid and tolled applicable filing deadlines. | Defendants: Judiciary lacks authority to change legislatively enacted limitation periods. | Court avoided deciding the constitutional/authority question and resolved the case on statutory/textual grounds. |
| 2) Scope of the Administrative Orders — do they suspend/toll pre‑commencement notice periods (the 182‑day period under MCL 600.2912b)? | Armijo: The AOs extended filing deadlines and therefore effectively preserved time to file here. | Defendants: The Amended AO confirms it does not suspend/toll periods that must elapse before commencement; the AOs apply only to deadlines occurring during the state of emergency. | Court: The Amended AO’s plain language clarifies it did not suspend/toll the 182‑day notice period; that period continued to run. |
| 3) Whether the AOs’ tolling can extend deadlines beyond the state of emergency or "toll the tolling" (double tolling) | Armijo: COVID orders should extend filing opportunities and prevent late dismissal. | Defendants: No double tolling; the notice‑tolling and COVID orders cannot be stacked to extend deadlines after the AO period ended. | Court: Because the Amended AO did not toll the notice period or pre‑commencement periods, there was no basis for double tolling; COVID exclusion did not extend Armijo’s filing deadline. |
| 4) Was Armijo’s complaint timely filed? | Armijo: Complaint timely when measured with the AOs in effect. | Defendants: Complaint filed after September 4, 2020 and thus time‑barred. | Court: Armijo’s complaint (filed Dec. 14, 2020) was untimely; summary disposition for defendants required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v Mercy Mem Hosp Corp, 466 Mich 196 (Mich. 2002) (medical‑malpractice limitations governed by statute)
- Carmichael v Henry Ford Hosp, 276 Mich App 622 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (standard of review for summary disposition and statute‑of‑limitations defenses)
- J & J Const Co v Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, Local 1, 468 Mich 722 (Mich. 2003) (avoid deciding constitutional issues when case can be disposed on other grounds)
- Green v Ziegelman, 282 Mich App 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (rules of construction for court rules and administrative orders)
- Vyletel‑Rivard v Rivard, 286 Mich App 13 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (interpretation of court rules to effect drafter’s intent)
- Henry v Dow Chem Co, 484 Mich 483 (Mich. 2009) (consider administrative order language as whole; plain language controls)