929 F.3d 569
8th Cir.2019Background
- Marvin Orlando Johnson, a pretrial detainee (Nov 2014–June 2016), suffered from multiple cavities and recurring tooth pain while in custody.
- The jail contracted MEND Correctional Care for on-site medical triage and coordination; Dr. John M. Collier (K.O.A.L.A. Dental Care II, LLC) provided dental services but required U.S. Marshals Service prior authorization for certain procedures.
- MEND repeatedly evaluated Johnson, provided over-the-counter analgesics (Dentek, ibuprofen, Tylenol), placed him on Collier’s dental list, and referred concerns to Collier; Collier performed multiple visits, temporary fillings, one extraction, and several permanent fillings over ~17 months.
- Procedurally, Collier was initially defaulted for failing to answer (alleged service misspelling); the district court set aside default. MEND and Collier each moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted both motions. Johnson appealed.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it held the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside default, had jurisdiction over the appeal as to MEND, and that summary judgment was proper because Johnson failed to show deliberate indifference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused discretion in setting aside Clerk’s entry of default against Collier | Collier was properly served and default should stand | Collier lacked service due to typo, promptly sought counsel on learning of suit, and had meritorious defenses | No abuse of discretion; default properly set aside (good cause: marginal failure, meritorious defense, no prejudice) |
| Whether this court has jurisdiction to review MEND’s summary judgment (notice of appeal omitted Aug 2017 order) | Pro se notice sufficiently indicated intent to appeal final judgment and related rulings | Notice did not explicitly list the August 2017 order granting MEND summary judgment | Court exercised jurisdiction — construed pro se notice liberally; no prejudice to appellees |
| Whether MEND was deliberately indifferent by providing OTC meds and not prescribing stronger pain meds or ensuring Marshals’ approvals | MEND denied adequate pain management, delayed approvals, and forwarded concerns inadequately | MEND followed protocol: triaged, examined, provided OTC meds, placed Johnson on dental list, and relayed concerns to Collier | No deliberate indifference; disagreement over treatment type (OTC vs prescription) is not constitutional; treatment was reasonable |
| Whether Collier was deliberately indifferent by delaying permanent fillings (esp. tooth #13) and failing to secure/act on prior authorizations | Collier unreasonably delayed permanent treatment and may have ignored approvals, causing prolonged pain | Collier treated Johnson ten times, provided temporary care, performed fillings/extraction, and cited lack of Marshals’ approval; temporary fillings were a reasonable course of treatment | No deliberate indifference; consistent, adequate treatment and temporary fillings do not show criminal recklessness or intentional maltreatment |
Key Cases Cited
- Stephenson v. El-Batrawi, 524 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard for reviewing setting aside default)
- Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 1998) (factors for good cause to set aside default)
- Grant v. City of Blytheville, 841 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2016) (setting aside default where no prejudice and meritorious defense)
- Oberstar v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1993) (judicial preference for adjudication on the merits)
- Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336 (8th Cir. 2011) (summary judgment review; deliberate indifference standard)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1976) (deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates Eighth Amendment)
- Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 2004) (pretrial detainee standard tied to Eighth Amendment; delays can raise triable issue)
- Fourte v. Faulkner County, 746 F.3d 384 (8th Cir. 2014) (deliberate indifference requires more than gross negligence; may be shown by intentionally maltreating care)
- Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439 (8th Cir. 2010) (high evidentiary threshold for deliberate indifference at summary judgment)
- Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1997) (medical records and physician affidavits can preclude claim where care shown to be adequate)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (U.S. 1994) (responding reasonably to known risk can preclude liability)