Martines Palmeiro Construction, LLC v. Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, The, 1:17-cv-02604

MPC sued three union defendants in Denver District Court alleging multiple claims, including tortious interference and trespass; defendants removed to federal court claiming complete preemption by §303 of the LMRA.
MPC filed an emergency motion to remand; the federal court initially denied remand, holding the tortious interference claim was completely preempted.
MPC moved for a preliminary injunction; before a hearing, MPC amended its complaint to delete the tortious interference claim and related allegations, leaving only a state-law trespass claim and request for injunctive relief.
MPC filed a renewed motion to remand, arguing federal jurisdiction no longer existed because only state-law trespass remained.
Defendants opposed remand, arguing the amended complaint still, in substance, pursues the preempted tortious interference theory (i.e., it was "trespass in camouflage").
The court found the amended complaint, read as a whole, alleges only trespass; defendants’ selective quotation arguments did not preserve federal jurisdiction, so the case was remanded to state court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether federal-question jurisdiction remains after MPC amended to remove the §303-preempted claim	MPC: No — amendment removed the federal/preempted claim, leaving only state trespass	Defs: Yes — amended pleading still effectively pursues tortious interference disguised as trespass	Court: No jurisdiction; remand granted
Whether the amended complaint should be construed by isolated phrases or as a whole	MPC: Must be read as a whole; removed preempted allegations	Defs: Selected phrases show continued interference theory	Court: Must be construed as whole; selective quotations insufficient
Whether pre-amendment documents (e.g., cease-and-desist letter) dictate jurisdiction	MPC: Letter predated suit; does not revive removed claims	Defs: Letter shows real intent to pursue interference claim	Court: Letter is evidentiary and not dispositive of pleading jurisdiction; irrelevant to present jurisdictional question
Burden of proof for federal jurisdiction on removal	MPC: Not applicable after amendment	Defs: Must show federal jurisdiction persists	Court: Burden on removing parties; defendants failed to show jurisdiction remains

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (well-pleaded complaint rule governs federal-question jurisdiction)
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (federal jurisdiction exists only when complaint pleads a federal cause of action)
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (well-pleaded complaint rule / federal-question jurisdiction precedent)
Kasishke v. Keppler, 158 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1947) (legal instruments and pleadings must be construed as a whole, not by isolated phrases)