Martin Valdez, Jr. v. W. Montgomery
918 F.3d 687
| 9th Cir. | 2019Background
- Valdez was convicted in California of murder and related crimes and sentenced to life without parole plus additional years; state appellate court affirmed and California Supreme Court denied review in July 2013.
- He filed a first state habeas petition in California Superior Court on April 10, 2014, which was denied May 15, 2014.
- Valdez waited until April 29, 2015 to file a second state habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal raising the same claims; that petition was denied without explanation; he then filed in the California Supreme Court which denied relief.
- Valdez constructively filed his federal habeas petition on March 1, 2016; the district court ordered him to show cause why the petition was not barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.
- Valdez argued he was entitled to statutory tolling because he waited for People v. Elizalde and due to case complexity; the district court rejected tolling and dismissed the petition as untimely; Valdez appealed but did not challenge equitable tolling (waived).
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding Valdez was not entitled to statutory tolling for the ~11.5-month gap between state petitions and that the district court did not err in resolving timeliness without ordering the state to lodge the full record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AEDPA statute of limitations was tolled during the gap between state petitions (May 15, 2014 to Apr 29, 2015) | Valdez: entitled to statutory tolling because he awaited California Supreme Court decision in Elizalde and case complexity justified delay | State: gap ~11.5 months was untimely under California’s "reasonable time" standard and precedent; no good cause shown | Court held no statutory tolling; the second petition was untimely because the delay lacked good cause and did not meet California’s reasonable-time standard |
| Whether the "look-through" doctrine establishes timeliness because the Superior Court found the first petition timely and the Court of Appeal denied without explanation | Valdez: presume Court of Appeal adopted Superior Court’s reasoning, making petition timely | State: look-through inapplicable because timeliness of the second petition is a distinct issue from timeliness of the first | Held: Look-through doctrine does not apply; silence in the Court of Appeal does not establish timeliness; court independently assessed delay |
| Whether waiting for Elizalde provided good cause for delay | Valdez: waited for Elizalde which was relevant to his claims, so good cause exists | State: Valdez filed his second petition before Elizalde was decided, so waiting cannot explain the delay | Held: Rejected — filing occurred before Elizalde decision, so that reason does not explain the delay |
| Whether district court erred by dismissing without ordering the State to lodge the state-court record | Valdez: district court needed full record to assess timeliness | State: district court had dates, filings, and the Court of Appeal dismissal attached; sufficient to decide timeliness | Held: No error — district court provided notice, afforded opportunity to respond, and had necessary materials to rule |
Key Cases Cited
- Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006) (California habeas is timely if filed within a "reasonable time"; guideposts for gap tolling)
- Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (AEDPA tolling while a properly filed state habeas petition is pending)
- Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2011) (state petition is pending while ordinary collateral review continues)
- Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2005) (untimely initial state petition precludes tolling)
- Robinson v. Lewis, 795 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2015) (60-day benchmark for reasonable delay; courts may allow longer with good cause)
- Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010) (AEDPA one-year statute applies when conviction is final before filing federal petition)