Martin v. State
298 Ga. 259
| Ga. | 2015Background
- Defendant DeKelvin Martin was convicted by a jury of multiple crimes arising from an October 1, 2002 home invasion in which he stabbed to death a 12‑year‑old (Savion Wright) and an elderly man (Travis Ivery), fatally wounded an elderly woman (Ila Ivery) who later died of complications, and committed sexual assaults against his girlfriend (Tymika Wright) in front of their 2‑year‑old child; jury recommended death for two murders and the trial court imposed two death sentences plus additional prison terms.
- Martin initially pled guilty and received a death sentence in a 2005 bench proceeding, later moved to withdraw that plea; after recusal issues and counsel disputes he received a retrial before a jury in 2009.
- Key factual disputes at trial and on appeal included sufficiency of the evidence for rape, admissibility and form of victim‑impact statements (including reading a written statement by deceased victim), propriety of various prosecutorial arguments, jury selection challenges based on death‑penalty views, and several sentencing‑phase instruction and verdict‑form issues (including unanimity on aggravating circumstances).
- The trial court disqualified Martin’s original post‑plea counsel as likely necessary witnesses to contested off‑the‑record communications with the original judge; Martin was represented at retrial by substitute counsel.
- The Georgia Supreme Court undertook sufficiency, instructional, evidentiary, juror‑related, sentencing, and proportionality review and affirmed the convictions and death sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Martin's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for rape conviction | Evidence insufficient; victim delayed reporting and alleged rape occurred ambiguously during aftermath | Victim testimony (two separate coercive sexual episodes) and circumstantial evidence support finding of forcible rape and penetration | Conviction for rape supported; jury reasonably could find coercion and penetration beyond reasonable doubt |
| Disqualification of original counsel | Judge abused discretion by removing long‑standing counsel (violating right to counsel of choice for indigent) | Counsel were necessary witnesses about contested off‑the‑record promise; ethical rules (advocate/witness conflict) justified disqualification | No abuse of discretion; judge properly balanced defendant’s interest and countervailing ethical concerns |
| Death‑penalty statute challenges (facial/selection) | Statutes vague/discriminatory and prosecutor discretion improper | Georgia scheme and jury instructions provide adequate guidance; prosecutorial discretion and proportionality review constitutional | Issues forfeited in part and meritless on the record — statutes upheld as applied |
| Juror challenges for cause (death‑penalty views) | Court improperly excused or kept jurors based on views derived from religion or death‑penalty attitudes | Trial court appropriately assessed each veniremember’s ability to follow law and be impartial; deference due | Trial court’s rulings on three challenged jurors affirmed; no reversible abuse of discretion |
| Jury instruction on "guilty but mentally ill" effect | Charge misleading in death case because it did not tell jury that sentencing phase would still occur | Court followed statutory and pattern charge; not plain error absent objection | No plain error; additional modern pattern language preferable but omission not clear, obvious prejudicial error |
| Prosecutor closing arguments (guilt and penalty phases) | Several remarks were improper (vouching, golden‑rule, commenting on silence, inflaming compassion) | Remarks were permissible commentary on evidence or not naturally read as comment on defendant’s silence; any impropriety was forfeited | Majority of objections forfeited; where arguable impropriety existed, appellate review found no reasonable probability it altered sentencing outcome |
| Victim‑impact evidence and prior statement read by third party | Reading unsworn written statements and including passages not previously read was hearsay/false and violated confrontation/due process | Statements were prior victim impact testimony, not shown false; any error forfeited and harmless on proportionality review | No reversible error; limited portions improperly expressive/opinionated but harmless given overwhelming evidence |
| Jury unanimity on aggravating circumstances / verdict form | Verdict form split multi‑part (b)(7) aggravator into separate lines, risking non‑unanimous findings | Jury instructions and verdict form read together show jury required unanimous written finding of at least one aggravator | Jury’s findings were unanimous as required; form defect harmless because Georgia law does not give added weight to multiple aggravators once one is found |
| Juror extraneous information (Dept. of Corrections employee juror) | Juror Lemmond injected extrajudicial facts about prison life, amounting to misconduct and prejudicial evidence | Juror’s vocational knowledge informed deliberations but did not introduce facts about defendant or crime; voir dire revealed her background | No reversible misconduct; juror’s prior experience permissible context and was known in voir dire |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (constitutional standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (State must submit aggravating‑circumstance findings to jury)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance / prejudice standard referenced for plain‑error review)
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (plea‑procedure due process principles)
- Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704 (Georgia death‑penalty review for passion, prejudice, arbitrary factors)
- Kelly v. State, 290 Ga. 29 (four‑part plain‑error test applied)
- Spraggins v. State, 258 Ga. 32 (guilty but mentally ill charge interpretation)
- Lance v. State, 275 Ga. 11 (juror death‑penalty qualification standard and unanimity aspects)