Martin v. O'Daniel
507 S.W.3d 1
Ky.2016Background
- Stephen O’Daniel, a retired KSP officer, bought a Corvette later discovered to be stolen; KSP detectives Martin, Motley, and supervisor Sapp investigated a possibly fraudulent title application.
- KSP investigators presented their findings to Franklin County Commonwealth’s Attorney Cleveland, who declined prosecution and requested a special prosecutor from the Attorney General.
- Jefferson County Commonwealth’s Attorney David Stengel was appointed special prosecutor, presented the case to a grand jury, and an indictment for second-degree forgery issued; O’Daniel was later acquitted at trial.
- O’Daniel sued the officers for malicious prosecution, alleging they promoted the indictment and concealed exculpatory evidence; officers moved for summary judgment asserting immunity and arguing they did not "institute or continue" the proceedings.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the officers (relying in part on Rehberg); the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded; the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the reversal but revised the legal standard and remanded for reconsideration under Kentucky law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers are entitled to absolute immunity for grand jury/trial testimony | O’Daniel: immunity does not shield non-testimonial, investigative acts that procured prosecution | Officers: Rehberg grants absolute immunity for grand jury witnesses; testimony privileged | Court: Absolute immunity for testimony exists under Rehberg in §1983 context, but does not shield other investigative acts alleged to procure prosecution; summary judgment on this ground denied |
| Whether qualified official immunity bars malicious prosecution claims | O’Daniel: malice alleged, so immunity inapplicable | Officers: qualified immunity protects their investigative judgment | Court: Qualified immunity applies only to good-faith acts; malice is an element of malicious prosecution and, if proven, defeats qualified immunity; court treated the issue as a factual one for the jury |
| Proper standard for showing defendant "instituted or procured" prosecution | O’Daniel: officers allegedly induced/procured prosecution (e.g., withholding exculpatory evidence, influencing prosecutor) | Officers: they did not arrest, file complaint, or procure indictment; prosecutors made charging decisions | Court: "At the instance of" in Raine is ambiguous; adopts Restatement-style formulation (initiated, continued, or procured) and holds procuring can include inducing prosecutors by misleading information; remand for application of revised elements |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate given the record facts | O’Daniel: factual disputes on malice, procurement, and probable cause preclude summary judgment | Officers: record shows prosecutors independently proceeded, probable cause existed, and no solicitation/insistence by officers | Court: factual disputes remain (malice, procurement, evidence suppression) so summary judgment improper; remand for proceedings under clarified elements |
Key Cases Cited
- Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 (2012) (grand jury witness testimony is absolutely privileged in §1983 actions)
- Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981) (previous Kentucky articulation of malicious prosecution elements; abrogated in part by this opinion)
- Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2010) (federal §1983 malicious-prosecution formulation relied on by Court of Appeals but deemed inapposite as controlling Kentucky law)
- Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001) (explains qualified official immunity applies only to good-faith conduct)
- Mosier v. McFarland, 106 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1937) (malice may be inferred from absence of probable cause; factual issue for jury)