Martin v. Mahr Machine Rebuilding
2017 Ohio 1101
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff William F. Martin (D&M Trucking) stored trucks on CEI-leased property that he accessed via a driveway across NPK property under a 2003 written authorization labeled a revocable "temporary access" license.
- Martin never paid consideration to NPK or entered a contract; NPK management testified the access was a revocable license, not an enforceable lease.
- In 2009 a dispute between Martin and adjacent landowner/appellee Mahr culminated in Mahr placing a lock, sign, and a car blocking the gate on NPK property; NPK later sent Martin a letter rescinding the 2003 authorization.
- Martin obtained alternate access a few months later and sued Mahr Machine Rebuilding, Fred Mahr, and Execumahr LLC for conversion and tortious interference with contract; the trial court ruled for defendants on both claims.
- On appeal Martin argued the trial court added an unlawful-act requirement to conversion and improperly recognized third-party permission as a defense; the appellate majority affirmed, holding Martin only had a revocable license (no enforceable property right) and defendants acted with NPK’s permission.
- A dissent argued there was competent evidence of wrongful denial of access (temporary tenancy/easement-like rights, lack of reasonable notice) and would have reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff proved conversion | Martin: defendants wrongfully exerted control over his property by blocking access, constituting conversion | Mahr: actions were taken on NPK property with NPK’s permission, so not wrongful | Court: No conversion — plaintiff only had a revocable license, defendants acted with permission, conduct not wrongful |
| Whether third-party permission is a defense to conversion | Martin: NPK could not revoke Martin’s right; he had a legal right to use driveway | Mahr: NPK’s license was revocable; third-party permission neutralizes wrongful conduct | Court: Not a new defense — permission meant defendants had equal/superior right; conduct lawful |
| Whether trial court imposed extra element (unlawful act) on conversion | Martin: court required proof that defendants’ act was unlawful beyond ordinary conversion elements | Mahr: "wrongful" = element of conversion; court merely found conduct not wrongful | Court: No extra element — court’s language meant defendants’ conduct lacked the wrongful/unlawful quality required for conversion |
| Whether reasonable notice / tenancy principles supported reversal (dissent) | Martin (dissent): implied tenancy/easement and lack of reasonable notice make defendants’ actions wrongful and support conversion/tortious interference | Mahr: NPK could rescind license; no enforceable contract obligating continued access | Majority: Found no enforceable right; dissent would have found competent evidence to reverse |
Key Cases Cited
- C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (trial court judgment will be reversed if unsupported by competent, credible evidence)
- Littlejohn v. Parrish, 163 Ohio App.3d 456 (2005) (every contract contains an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing)
- Manifold v. Schuster, 67 Ohio App.3d 251 (tenancy at will converted to periodic tenancy upon payment and acceptance of monies)
- Cambridge Village Condominium Assn. v. Cambridge Condominium Assn., 139 Ohio App.3d 328 (2000) (license is a privilege terminable at the will of the licensor)
- Bell v. Horton, 113 Ohio App.3d 363 (elements required to prove tortious interference with contract)