Martin v. Hamilton State Bank
323 Ga. App. 185
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Larry Martin defaulted on promissory notes; Bartow County Bank obtained judgment and accelerated the debt.
- After Martin filed a notice of appeal (Martin I), Bartow County Bank’s assets (including the loan/judgment) were assigned to Hamilton State Bank (HSB).
- HSB moved to be substituted as party plaintiff; Martin consented by signing two trial-court orders: substitution/assignment to HSB and terms requiring Martin to post a supersedeas bond or pledge collateral acceptable to HSB.
- This Court affirmed summary judgment for the bank in Martin I; the Supreme Court denied certiorari and this Court’s remittitur issued.
- After remittitur (but before it was filed), Martin filed an emergency motion seeking to limit HSB’s enforcement/fi. fa. by requiring proof of the consideration HSB paid for the assigned judgment.
- The trial court adopted this Court’s Martin I decision as its own and resolved supersedeas-bond issues; Martin appeals two trial-court orders (A13A0272 and A13A0630).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Martin) | Defendant's Argument (HSB) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court could be required to limit fi. fa./enforcement based on consideration HSB paid for assigned judgment | Assignment occurred after the original judgment; changed facts require re‑examination and proof of consideration before enforcement | Prior appellate affirmance and Martin’s consent to substitution/assignment preclude relitigation; issue outside scope of prior appeal | Court: barred — appellate affirmance and remittitur control; Martin waived/consented; trial court properly adopted Martin I as its judgment |
| Whether Martin could raise the consideration issue after filing his first appeal and posting supersedeas | Filing notice of appeal deprived trial court of power then to decide such issues, so he could not have raised it earlier | Martin consented to substitution and bond terms; cannot now challenge what he agreed to | Court: waived — litigant who consents cannot later complain; issue forfeited |
| Whether trial court erred in treating Martin’s supersedeas bond as expired and ordering a new bond | The original supersedeas should have remained in effect; ordering a new bond was error | Trial court acted within discretion under submitted agreements and post-remittitur posture | Court: appeal as to new-bond order dismissed as moot; underlying Martin I decision controls |
| Whether Martin could expand scope of prior appeal on second appeal by attacking remittitur judgment | He argued new facts justify revisiting judgment on remittitur | Appellate rulings bind subsequent proceedings; cannot enlarge prior appeal’s scope | Court: not permitted — prior affirmance binding; remittitur adopted as judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Durham v. Crawford, 196 Ga. 381 (1943) (former judgment binds only as to facts existing at that time; changed facts may permit re-examination)
- McDaniel v. City of Griffin, 281 Ga. App. 350 (2006) (one may not introduce new defenses after summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor to evade former judgment)
- Jebco Ventures v. City of Smyrna, 259 Ga. 599 (1989) (notice of appeal with payment of costs serves as supersedeas unless trial court requires bond)
- Pearle Optical of Monroeville v. State Bd. of Examiners, 219 Ga. 856 (1964) (appellate rulings are binding in subsequent proceedings)